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As we endeavor to make The Journal a forum of information and ideas for the conventional weapons destruction com-
munity, we look at the threat improvised explosive devices (IED) pose in countries around the world. Increasingly, human-
itarian organizations are widening their scope to account for the prevalence of IEDs. The need for clear communication 
across humanitarian mine action and counter-IED (C-IED) operational lines is evident.
In this issue of The Journal, we feature the challenges that humanitarian organizations face when incorporating IEDs 
into their operational activities. Robert Keeley from Danish Demining Group (DDG) discusses the nuances of differen-
tiating a landmine, a booby trap, and an IED and how overlaps between humanitarian mine action and C-IED can cause 
misunderstandings. Focusing on Somalia, Abigail Jones of the Danish Refugee Council explains the need to tailor risk ed-
ucation approaches for populations affected by IEDs, while Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton illustrate the work being done 
in the Middle East by MAG (Mines Advisory Group) through photos and express the need to distinguish between humani-
tarian and military involvement in conflict areas.
In celebration of the twentieth anniversary of mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we spotlight the accomplish-
ments, lessons learned, and future challenges for the region. In his article, Ian Mansfield examines the transition process 
that gave the country’s government ownership of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre. In addition, Gregor 
Sančanin explores the sociocultural aspects of the region and the remaining work to be done. 
Looking back, Roly Evans from GICHD remembers the United Kingdom’s coastal minefields during World War II and 
the techniques used by Royal Engineers to prioritize clearance and manage resources effectively. In addition, we high-
light the Schonstedt Humanitarian Demining Initiative, a partnership between the public, private, and civil sector aimed 
at providing magnetic locators to the countries that need them most. In our Research and Development section, Milan 
Bajić, Tamara Ivelja, and Anna Brook write about the use of hyperspectral remote sensing technology and Ian McLean and 
Rebecca Sargisson present on the effects of weather on the detection abilities of giant African pouched rats.
 After months of planning, the CISR team and Croatian Mine Action Centre implemented our third Regional Senior 
Managers Course in Biograd na Moru, Croatia, from March 20 to April 7. Moreover, our annual Post-Conflict Recovery 
Week featured Adnan Al Aboudi from Jordan’s Higher Council for Affairs of Persons with Disabilities who spoke about 
his experience with campaigning for disability rights and Mona Abdeljawad from the Rights and Development Center in 
Jordan who spoke about the situation of Syrian refugees with disabilities in the Middle East. Lastly, CISR will be presenting 
on The Journal at the 14th International Symposium “Mine Action 2017” in Croatia in April, and will be on hand to speak 
with potential contributors. We hope to see you there!
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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED):  
A HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION PERSPECTIVE
by Robert Keeley
FEATURE
Readers of this Journal need no schooling in the ac-celeration of the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) over the last 20 years. However, what has be-
come obvious in the last few years is the degree to which the 
spheres of counter-IED (C-IED) and humanitarian mine ac-
tion (HMA) now overlap. Danish Demining Group (DDG), 
for example, recently calculated that an estimated 67 percent 
of the countries where DDG is present also have an IED prob-
lem. In countries such as Afghanistan, IEDs are now the ma-
jor cause of explosive-related casualties among the general 
population, the very constituents nongovernment organiza-
tions (NGO) and HMA sectors support. This raises questions 
of whether or not an NGO engaged in C-IED efforts can be 
classically impartial in circumstances where these IEDs are 
active. This is a significant difference for a sector primarily fo-
cused on dealing with the legacies of conflict that are explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW). Yet, while undertaking a series 
of risk assessments to help identify an appropriate approach 
for an NGO active in HMA, it became clear that there was a 
need for better common terminology in order for HMA actors 
to identify the appropriate response. The aim of this article is 
to outline how this thought process evolved in DDG in or-
der to set the ground for subsequent discussion of these risk- 
analysis processes.
What is an IED?
The name says it all. An IED is an explosive device that is 
made in an improvised manner. British parliamentarians cur-
rently define an IED as:
 A device placed or fabricated in an improvised 
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, 
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to 
destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.1
This term hides a multiplicity of variations: it might be a 
device based on a recycled item of unexploded ordnance 
(UXO), or built around a repurposed item of abandoned ex-
plosive ordnance (AXO) found in an unsecured or raided am-
munition stockpile. It might also be built from scratch from 
homemade explosives (HME). However, the common factor 
amongst these variations is that these constructions are im-
provised as opposed to factory-made, standardized weapons 
used for their intended purpose. In summary, the term IED is 
about how the weapon is made. 
What is the difference between an IED, a booby trap, or 
an improvised mine? Not much, in some cases. A booby trap 
is defined as follows:
An explosive or non-explosive device, or other material, 
deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently 
harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is 
performed.2
Booby
Trap
Mine
IED
“Artisanal Mine”
Figure 1. How IED terms overlap.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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One can immediately see how easily these two terms over-
lap. It is possible to set up an IED to produce such a situation. 
Yet the term booby trap can also apply to non-explosive traps 
(e.g., punji sticks in Vietnam) and a command-detonated IED 
is not necessarily linked to the person carrying out an appar-
ently harmless act. If the term IED is about how the device is 
made, the term booby trap describes how the device is set up 
to function.
Thirdly, one must consider how improvised or artisanal 
mines fit into this taxonomy. The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) defined a mine as:
any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.3 
Here we see another overlap. Mines are commonly factory-
built, but it is quite possible to make a victim-operated IED. 
The mine definition is about how the device is initiated.
One could easily spend time wrestling with these defini-
tions. Take any particular device: which one of these catego-
ries does it fit into? In many cases, a given device can fit in two, 
sometimes even three, categories at once. Because these terms 
developed from different historical roots, they overlap and de-
scribe different attributes of the device: the way it is constructed, 
the way it is set up, and the way it is initiated (Figure 1, page 5). 
If the terms aren’t used correctly, there is a risk of over- 
reporting the problem. Secondly, because of their improvised 
nature, IEDs often require different training and equipment 
for counteractions; if the problem is misunderstood, the bal-
ance of training and other resources will also be wrong.
Moreover, there have been efforts to adjust the definition 
of booby trap to only cover factory-built devices. From the 
author’s perspective, this attempt to square the definition cir-
cle is not helpful. The terms describe different attributes, and 
trying to make them fit a convenient perspective could simply 
add further confusion.4 Perhaps a booby trap is not a separate 
type of weapon but merely another method of deployment.
How do IEDs fit into the spectrum of explosive incidents? 
In situations of counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, or 
internal security, the civilian population, civil power, human-
itarian actors, and security forces face a range of different ex-
plosive threats, of which IEDs are only part of the spectrum. 
NATO’s early work in Afghanistan helps to untangle the 
range of these threats.5 Figure 2 was developed as a risk as-
sessment carried out by the author on behalf of the U.N. Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) in Mali in October 2015.
Figure 3 (page 7) helps clarify a number of points. First, cur-
rent security incidents (case 2) can stand alongside incidents 
from legacy weapons (case 1). In fact, these legacy weapons led 
to the establishment of the HMA sector. Second, current and 
active security incidents can involve a range of weapons that 
are not IEDs, including direct fire, indirect fire from factory- 
built mortars, surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks on civil 
aircraft, or placement of factory-built anti-tank mines—all of 
which are significant but not IED incidents. It should also be 
noted that, for clarity, the diagram does not include the range 
of criminal weapon uses that might be included under a wider 
definition of armed violence (case 3) such as armed robbery, 
inter-communal disputes, or even domestic violence.
How Do We Describe Different IEDs?
During the 20th century, simpler terms were in use such as 
letter bombs, parcel bombs, unattended bags, and car bombs. 
Figure 2. NATO weapons definitions from Afghanistan. Note that this does include reference to “legacy” incidents from explosive 
remnants of war.
Figure courtesy of UNMAS.
Security incidents are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire i.e. mortar, rocket and artillery, 
surface-to-air fire, and explosive hazard) events to include executed attacks (i.e. IED explosion, mine strike) and potential 
or attempted attacks (i.e. IEDs, mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) which are not included.
Security incidents do not include friendly action incidents such as direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly 
forces. Enemy-initiated attacks are all enemy action (i.e. enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and 
explosive hazard events to include executed attacks only (i.e. IED explosions and mine strikes). Potential or attempted 
attacks (i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins) are not included.
IED events comprise explosive hazard events, both executed (i.e. IED explosion/mine strike) and potential IED/mine attacks 
(i.e. IEDs/mines found & cleared, premature IED detonations, IED turn-ins).
A complex attack is an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon 
systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED, and surface-to-air fire) against one or more targets.
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These terms were not precise but counter-IED personnel knew 
what they meant. In recent years, there has been a signifi-
cant proliferation of terms (particularly involving acronyms) 
intended to make our vocabulary more exact. However, this 
article argues that the opposite was achieved. We now have 
vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED), victim-operated IEDs (VOIED), 
command wire detonated IEDs (CWIED), suicide vehicle-
borne IEDs (SVBIED), improvised rocket-assisted munitions 
(IRAM), etc. While it is comparatively easy to learn what these 
acronyms mean, perhaps they obscure what is actually needed 
for a fuller analysis.
These terms describe one or both of two main attributes 
of IEDs: the nature of the containment and the means of ini-
tiation. Thus a VBIED can be command detonated by wire 
(CWIED) or remote control (RCIED), it could be detonated 
on a timer, victim-operated (VOIED) or be operated by a sui-
cide bomber (SVBIED). So, which one of these is it?6 
Currently, organizations tend to use a reporting form with 
a list of boxes for each of these terms and ask reporting offi-
cers to select one. This fails the rule of lists, which requires 
a list to be both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive.7 One-dimensional lists simply cannot consider some-
thing with two variable attributes without significantly more 
letters. Yet an IED in a car initiated by a com-
mand wire could be reported by a peacekeeping 
contingent as a VBIED while another unit re-
cords an identical device as a CWIED. There are 
two implications. The security forces will be un-
able to correctly analyze the threat and design 
the appropriate response if the dataset is incom-
plete. Additionally, it will be harder to design 
appropriate risk education from the humanitar-
ian perspective if both attributes are not clearly 
understood.
Risk is a precise mathematical term that con-
siders both the probability of a particular inci-
dent occurring and the severity of its outcome. 
The containment of an IED and its size speaks 
directly to the severity of the potential outcome. 
A Unabomber-style letter bomb can potentially 
hurt one or two people: a van full of ammonium 
nitrate can bring down an entire federal build-
ing in Oklahoma, whereas the means of initia-
tion speaks to the probability of the incidence. 
Furthermore, good risk education processes 
discuss and suggest safe behavior. In order to 
do this, it is critical that the people designing 
the risk education programs have a good understanding of the 
typical means of initiation used in order to provide advice on 
indicators, safe behavior, and containment.8
As a result, a matrix is the suggested means of describing 
and recording IED incidents, rather than a simple list of terms 
(Figure 4, page 8). 
Implications for Humanitarian Actors
There is clearly an overlap of IED, booby trap, and mine def-
initions. The terms are not interchangeable. The C-IED and 
HMA practitioners stand to benefit from recognizing this, as 
they set the basis for the rest of the taxonomy. Moreover, IEDs 
are only one part of a series of explosive and weapon-related 
hazards that might be faced in a particular country, including 
legacy ERW, attacks using factory-made weapons, and weap-
ons used in other incidents of armed violence that are not ter-
rorist or insurgency related. Classification of IED incidents, 
both in terms of containment and means of initiation, is im-
portant. By understanding the problem in terms of C-IED 
efforts, the community can appropriately target risk education 
messages with safe behavior.
As previously stated, while IEDs can consist of legacy weap-
ons, they are unlike ERW (in the context of HMA) in that 
they are often active. While some countries may have fields of 
Weapons
Incidents
1.  Legacy 
Incidents 
(ERW)
2. Security
 incidents
3. Other “Armed 
Violence”
2.1 Direct Fire 2.2 Indirect Fire 2.3 Surface/Air 2.4 Explosive Hazard Event
2.4a Executed 2.4b Potential 2.4c False Alarm
2.4a(1) Mine 2.4a(2) IED
2.4b(1) Cache 2.4b(2) Found
2.4c(1) Hoax 2.4c(2) Unintended
Figure 3. Description of IEDs.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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legacy improvised mines such as Sri Lanka, these are still the 
exception rather than the rule. The entire HMA sector is based 
on the assumption that when a conflict is over, the population 
will be united in wanting ERW removed. In an active conflict, 
clearance of active IEDs by HMA actors may be seen as a hos-
tile act. While it may be possible for commercial civilian op-
erators to deal with this, it is difficult for NGO actors to take 
a similar position. NGO personnel must already deal with the 
dilemma that they cannot be truly impartial, and an NGO 
that clears active IEDs is effectively taking part in the wider 
counterinsurgency. The security implications for the staff of 
that NGO are significant. Yet, some donors are asking NGOs 
to undertake IED disposal (IEDD); thus a wider understand-
ing and discussion of the issues are critical for everyone’s clar-
ity of purpose.
DDG has already looked at creating a more detailed risk 
analysis for organizations wishing to undertake IED risk edu-
cation. Furthermore, DDG is working to understand the steps 
needed for a humanitarian organization considering whether 
or not to undertake IEDD as humanitarian action: both of 
which might merit further discussions in later papers. 
See endnotes page 64
Ser Means of containment Typical means of Initiation Remarks
Timer Remote Controlled 
(RCIED)
Command Wire
(CWIED)
Victim operated
(VOIED)
Suicide Other
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f ) (g) (h) (i)
1 Letter bomb x
2 Pipe bomb x
3 Person-born IED (PBIED) x Suicide vest
4 Mortar or rocket x May be an improvised 
weapon or factory-
made weapon using 
improvised launcher
5 Buried bomb x x x Improvised mine when 
operated by victim
6 Box/briefcase/bag x x x x Includes typical 
roadside bomb, such as 
palm oil container
7 Vehicle born IED (VBIED) x x x x x Could be divided into 
small, medium or large
Figure 4. DDG IED classification matrix.
Figure courtesy of the author.
The original article first appeared in the Counter-IED Report, 
autumn 2016 edition. It has been edited for The Journal.
Dr. Robert Keeley
Chief Technical Advisor
Danish Demining Group
Dr. Robert Keeley is a former British Army 
bomb disposal officer who has worked in 
humanitarian mine action since 1991. His 
work has taken him to many countries in-
cluding Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia 
Croatia, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, 
Somalia, and Yemen. His work has encom-
passed a wide range of mine action and 
explosive ordnance disposal activities, including design and provi-
sion of mine risk education projects and victim assistance. Between 
2002 and 2006, he researched and completed a Ph.D. in Applied 
Environmental Economics at Imperial College, London. His thesis 
was entitled “The Economics of Landmine Clearance.” Since 2014 
he has been the chief technical advisor for Danish Demining Group.
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MAG: CLEARING IMPROVISED 
LANDMINES IN IRAQ
by Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]
FEATURE
These women have just crossed the frontline in eastern Mosul, northern Iraq where hundreds of people are crossing 
every day. At the camps set up by MAG’s humanitarian partners—often on land that was made safe from improvised 
landmines and unexploded ordnance by our teams—people who were displaced by the violence are provided with 
tented shelter and basic supplies. What they want most is to get home as soon as possible, once the violence has 
ceased. But people are losing lives, limbs, and livelihoods as they return to extensive contamination from landmines 
and booby traps in their homes, villages, and fields. We are in a race against time to get to these brutal, indiscriminate 
killers. In just three weeks in November 2016, in a single village east of Mosul, MAG cleared 250 improvised landmines. 
This could be 250 lives saved. Most of the improvised mines MAG found are powerful enough to rip apart a car but 
sensitive enough to be triggered by a child’s footstep.
All photos courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
MAG’s recent experience in the Middle East has shown that clearing improvised landmines can be achieved 
even in the most complex humanitarian contexts. It is imper-
ative that detail and specificity is given to discussions on im-
provised devices if we are to avoid negative repercussions for 
the safety of beneficiaries and humanitarian workers.
Munitions deployed on, under, or near the ground that are 
initiated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
regardless of whether they are improvised or not are anti-
personnel landmines, as defined by the Anti-personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) and Amended Protocol II of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). 
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One of the numerous landmines found close to houses marked off before it is defuzed and then destroyed. A destroyed Islamic 
State/Da’esh vehicle is in the background. Use of improvised or artisanal landmines is not a new phenomenon. MAG and other hu-
manitarian NGOs have found improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere for almost three decades. 
Technical Field Manager Mohammad Salaam has worked with MAG for 24 years in countries all over the world. He has never seen a 
more heavily mined place than his home region in northern Iraq. “We find more every day” he said.
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A week’s haul of explosive items are taken for demolition near Bashiqa, Iraq.
Deminers deal with explosive devices and landmines on the outskirts of Bashiqa, Iraq. Here the MAG team found six different items 
set up for command control and also pressure wires. Many vehicles passed over these explosives, very close to the pressure wires.
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 It follows, therefore, that improvised landmines fall within the scope of the 
APMBC and states’ commitment to 
uphold the highest standards of inter-
national humanitarian law.
When we call victim-activated im-
provised explosive devices (IED) what 
they are—landmines—it becomes clear 
that we can draw on the wealth of expe-
rience that exists within the mine action 
sector to tackle them in areas where the 
fighting has stopped. The humanitarian 
mine action community has addressed 
improvised landmines since the origins 
of the sector. Clearance of landmines—
improvised or not—has been a part 
of MAGs’ operational response from 
Angola to Afghanistan and Cambodia 
to Colombia.
This has given MAG the ability and te-
nacity to respond to new humanitarian 
emergencies, none more acute than the 
ongoing crisis in the Middle East. Since 
2014, MAG has seen the systematic pro-
duction and deployment of improvised 
landmines and booby traps by so-called 
Islamic State/Da’esh posing an immedi-
ate risk to civilians, especially return-
ing personnel and displaced persons. 
The scale of contamination dictates that 
the humanitarian need and the need for 
additional mine action capacity will in-
crease in the coming months, and urgent 
action is needed to prevent a large-scale 
landmine emergency. 
MAG launched a major humanitarian 
operation in 2014 in response to evidence 
of improvised landmine use in areas 
of Iraq formerly occupied by Islamic 
State/Da’esh. From September 2015 to 
January 2017, MAG cleared more than 
7,500 improvised landmines, booby 
traps, and other abandoned devic-
es in Iraq and Syria alone. By the time 
this article goes to print, we expect the 
number to escalate. Improvised land-
mines account for over 99 percent of the 
Rows of mines run through Tulluban village and other villages to the north, south, and 
east in Iraq.
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improvised munitions cleared as part of MAG’s humanitarian 
response in the Middle East. 
MAG has updated standard operating procedures (SOP) 
and organizational policy to respond to this type of context 
and contamination, and we have recruited and trained addi-
tional staff. This includes additional capacity for when fund-
ing becomes available.  Like any aspect of mine action, skills, 
training, equipment, and SOPs need to reflect the contami-
nation profile. As always, there needs to be robust quality 
management systems in place. This is no different for contam-
ination involving improvised landmines, booby traps, aban-
doned command operated IEDs, or explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) from improvised munitions. 
The real areas of novelty arise from the nature and com-
plexity of the conflicts in which we are seeking to meet 
humanitarian need. More than ever, conflicts span borders 
and some parties to conflict do not share the principles and 
value base that underpin humanitarian action. At the worst 
and unacceptable end of the spectrum, humanitarian workers 
are seen as legitimate targets. Inaction has consequences for 
people who are already enduring unimaginable suffering, so 
we must continue to develop policies and practices that fur-
ther humanitarian efforts.
The nature of many current conflicts means that we can-
not wait for the conflict to stop if we are to meet humani-
tarian need. Alongside our colleagues in the humanitarian 
sector, mine action NGOs undertaking emergency response 
programs must approach access in terms of areas where ac-
tive hostilities have ceased. To achieve this requires robust 
risk and security management. Our continued access and the 
After checking for booby traps in parts of the house still standing, a MAG technical field manager surveys the destruction caused 
when two villagers set off a booby trap when they opened a door. They were both killed.
13
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
14 FEATURE @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
Kermanshah- -
Qasr-e Shirin- -
Borujerd-
DAHUK-
A
S SU
LA
Y
M
N
YAH 
KARBALA'-
AN  NAJAF
AL BASRAH
MAYSAN-
Al Fallu
j h
 
As S
am
aw
ah
  
-
Al Mawsil
(Mosul)
Dahuk-
ё
Razzaza
LakeWadi a
l Ghadawi -
-
- ё
Euphrates 
Hawr al Hammar -
Shatt al Arab 
Persian
Gulf
Tigris 
Shatt al      Gharraf 
Euphrates 
Thartha
Lake
-
Na
hr
 al
 Kh
ab
ur
 
-
-
Gr
eat
  Za
b 
Lit
tle 
 Za
b 
Nahr al 'Uzaym 
Daryacheh-ye
Orumiyeh
(Lake Urmia)
-
-
Tigris 
Na
hr 
Di
ya
lб-
Habbaniyah
Lake
ё -
Qezel Owzan 
Rudhhaneh-ye mareh 
-
-
Wad
i al Ubayyid - -
-
Wad
i i H
awran 
- -
-
Buhayrat al
Qadisiyah-
Tikrit
-
As Salman-
Makhfar al Busayyah
Rafha
-Hafar al Batin 
Al Hayy
Al Faw-
Al Jahrah
Abu Sukhayr-
Khorramabad- -
Al Hadr
Tawuq- -
Abu Kamal- -
'Akashat- -
Trebil
Al Walid
Ar Raqqah
Dayr az Zawr
Ar Rutbah
'Aqrah
Zakhu- -
Hakkâri
Tall 'Afar
Sinjar-
Makhmur-
Kuysanjaq-Al Qayyarah
Rayat- -
Ilam- -
-
Shaykh Sa'd
Mehran-
Dehloran-
Al Qurnah
-Qal'at Salih
Qaryat al Gharab
Umm Qasr
Qal'at Sukkar
Zanjan-
Ar'ar
Judayyidat 'Ar'ar
Jalibah-
Al Ahmadi-
'Ali al Gharbi- -
Hit-
Al Hadithah-
Khanaqin
Bayji-
Mianeh--
Kh
orr
am
sh
ah
r 
Al Habbaniyah 
--
Nukhayb
Dezful-
Hamadan-
Sanandaj
Al Qamishli-- Miandowab
--
Orumiyeh
(Umia)
--
Ab
d
n 
Kirkuk-
An Najaf
Al Hillah Al Kut-
Karbala'-
Al 'Amarah-
An Nasiriyah- -
Ad Diwaniyah- - -
Ar Ramadi- -
Arbil-
Halabjah-
 As
Sulaymaniyah- -
Baghdad
Kuwait
A L  A N B A R-
AL  MUTHANN
BAGHDAD
-N I N A W Á
BABIL-
AL QADISIYAH--
SALAH AD 
DIN
-
-
DHI QAR- -
W A S I T-
S SU
KIRK K
IRAQ
The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
acceptance by the United Nations.
0 100 15050
0 100 15015050 200
200 mi
300 km
36°
34°
32°
30°
28°
36°
34°
32°
30°
42° 44° 46° 48°
42° 44° 46° 48°
JO
RD
AN
 
Chris Loughran
Director of Policy 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
Chris Loughran has more than 10 years 
experience working in the internation-
al nonprofit sector. Loughran joined MAG 
in 2006 and is currently director of policy 
for MAG, leading the organization’s stra-
tegic influencing work on disarmament is-
sues including landmines, illicit small arms 
and ammunition management. He holds a 
Bachelor of Arts from the University of Oxford (U.K.) and a mas-
ter’s degree in violence, conflict, and development studies from 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Sean Sutton
Communications Manager
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
Sean Sutton is an award-winning photojour-
nalist; his well-known pictures show the 
impact of landmines and explosive rem-
nants of war on communities and have 
been published and exhibited all over the 
world. His book documenting how unex-
ploded ordnance affect people in Laos 
was runner-up for the Leica European 
Publisher’s Award. Sutton is MAG’s international communica-
tions manager and has worked for the organization since 1997. 
safety and security of humanitarian workers and beneficiaries 
also depends on a clear and visible distinction between hu-
manitarian and military or security action. This is why MAG 
and other NGOs continue to press for a clear distinction and 
vision of labor between humanitarian operations and counter-
IED approaches. 
The challenges are complex, but they are not insurmount-
able, and we are achieving results. We are enabling the safe de-
livery of shelter, food, and medical aid by our humanitarian 
colleagues, and we are saving lives. This is all part of the mine 
action sector’s continued relevance, dynamism, and tireless 
work to prevent suffering, death, and injury.  
Children discuss MAG risk education posters placed in the Khazir internally displaced person (IDP) camp near Mosul, Iraq.
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FEATURE
DO NO HARM: THE CHALLENGE OF 
PROTECTING CIVILIANS FROM THE IED 
THREAT IN SOUTH-CENTRAL SOMALIA
By Abigail Jones [ Danish Refugee Council / Danish Demining Group ]
In many countries, improvised explosive devices (IED), in-cluding improvised landmines, now constitute more of a threat to civilians than factory-manufactured landmines 
and other conventional weapons. The Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2016 reported that the total number of ca-
sualties from victim-operated IEDs, which act in a similar 
manner to anti-personnel mines, increased from 1,075 in 2014 
to 1,331 in 2015, the highest annual total of IED casualties re-
corded since 1999.1 In response to this, humanitarian mine 
action organizations are expanding their scope of activities 
to include IED awareness for civilians either as a stand-alone 
activity or by integrating messages on IEDs into traditional 
mine risk education (MRE) sessions. This article explores the 
protection concerns related to the conduct of any educational 
activities on IEDs, with a particular focus on south-central 
Somalia. The article also discusses the challenges that exist 
for humanitarian organizations to successfully plan and im-
plement IED awareness while upholding the principle of “do 
no harm.” Furthermore, the article argues that there is a need 
to recognize that educational activities related to IEDs must 
be approached with methodologies, messages, and materials 
specific to these devices, as opposed to simply copying those 
that are considered to be effective for MRE.   
Importance of Risk Assessments 
As is the case with MRE, IED awareness should aim to 
reduce civilian casualties. However, a thorough risk assess-
ment is the first step in identifying the realistic benefits of 
IED awareness and ensuring that they significantly outweigh 
the potential associated risks. This is due to the fact that IED 
awareness has the potential to create serious protection issues 
for the civilian population, many of which are outlined in the 
rest of the article. There is also a risk that organizations will 
be seen as taking sides in the conflict. Therefore, a thorough 
risk assessment is a key decision-making tool to help organi-
zations understand the status of the device, the typical target, 
the common scenarios of use, and the implications of imple-
menting IED awareness for both the civilian population and 
the organization itself.2 However, the risk assessment should 
also present concrete risk-mitigation strategies. Moreover, due 
to the complexities created by dynamic conflicts, risk assess-
ments need to be made at regional or local levels in order to 
be relevant. The Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining 
Group (DRC/DDG) has designed such a risk assessment pro-
cess that is proposed as a framework for the drafting of a 
Technical Note on Mine Action in support of references to 
IEDs within International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
Analysis of the Situation in South-Central Somalia
In south-central Somalia, IEDs are actively being deployed 
by armed opposition groups, such as Harakaat al-Shabaab 
al-Mujaahidiin, as well as by criminal gangs and during inter- 
\militant conflict.3 These weapons bring the time, place, and 
method of attack fully under the operator’s control, hence 
the high prevalence of use. There are very few cases of lega-
cy devices because unused devices that did not detonate are 
typically retrieved and employed elsewhere.4 Humanitarian 
organizations looking into the feasibility of conducting IED 
awareness in south-central Somalia should be cognizant of the 
fact that, in this context, IEDs are not the after-effects of con-
flict but a tool actively used by armed opposition groups to 
destabilize and attack the state.5 Any organization getting in-
volved in this issue, regardless of altruistic intentions, risks 
being perceived as siding with one party to the conflict over 
the other, and could therefore become a target for al-Shabaab 
or other IED users. 
Data available from January to July 2016 demonstrates that 
40 percent of IED attacks in south-central Somalia during 
this period involved command-detonated IEDs, four percent 
were victim-operated IEDs (VOIED), and 56 percent were un-
known. The high percentage of devices listed as unknown is 
due to the challenges posed to carrying out post-blast forensic 
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investigations at the explosion sites, and it also highlights the 
difficulty of compiling accurate data on types of IEDs used. 
It should be noted that Somalia is following the IEDs evolu-
tion trend, as was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, with predict-
able increases in device complexity and explosive charge size.6 
However, Somalia is distinct from other countries due to the 
fact that a significant proportion of IEDs encountered in those 
countries are VOIEDs. 
Overwhelmingly, IED attacks in south-central Somalia tar-
get government agencies and representatives such as security 
personnel or government officials. The majority of IED at-
tacks target locations where government or security service 
personnel work, such as the July 2016 attack on the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) building in Mogadishu, and 
the two attacks on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu where the 
government often hosts major conferences.7 Incidents involv-
ing high-profile targets are typically complex attacks where 
vehicle-born IEDs (VBIED) or suicide VBIEDs (SVBIED) are 
used to initiate the attack, which is immediately followed by 
gunmen who wear suicide vests, also known as person-borne 
IEDs (PBIED). Complex attacks are also a tactic to intimidate 
the local population by showing that al-Shabaab can strike 
wherever and whenever they like, including in areas that are 
officially under the control of the Federal Government of 
Somalia. In addition, roadside IEDs are used to target mili-
tary and police convoys, such as when a remote-controlled 
IED (RCIED) exploded as a police vehicle passed it near the 
Black Sea neighborhood in Mogadishu on 11 November 2016.8 
Armed opposition groups (AOG) commonly use IEDs to 
target representatives of the international community, partic-
ularly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the 
United Nations, and other representatives of the diplomatic 
community. In these cases, they are targeted because they are 
perceived as supporting the Federal Government of Somalia 
and therefore are not considered to have a neutral or impar-
tial status, or—in the case of AMISOM—because they active-
ly engaged in combat against al-Shabaab. A recent example is 
an attack that targeted AMISON troops in El-Ade in January 
2016. The incident began with the detonation of a VBIED fol-
lowed by al-Shabaab fighters storming the base.9 Additionally, 
twin VBIED attacks were carried out near the airport in 
Mogadishu in July 2016 and reportedly killed ten people; the 
attack was claimed by the spokesperson of al-Shabaab to have 
targeted the headquarters of the African Union force.10  
In 2015, there were 887 IED casualties in south-central 
Somalia, 454 (51 percent) of which were civilians.11 Research 
indicates that in the majority of cases, civilian casualties are 
simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, caught in the 
Victim-operated
4%
Unknown
56%
Command-detonated
40%
Figure 1. 2016 IED snapshot: South-central Somalia.
Figure courtesy of the author.
The Ambassador Hotel.
All photos courtesy of UNMAS Somalia.
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initial blast or during the subsequent armed attack, such as 
when a roadside IED near Lafole town killed 18 civilians trav-
eling in a mini-bus that was escorted by a vehicle carrying 
government troops.12 In addition, there are increasing exam-
ples of deliberate attacks on public places that are considered 
too western and liberal, such as the three attacks on restau-
rants at Lido Beach in Mogadishu in 2016.
Gathering Information for IED Awareness
With civilians in south-central Somalia representing 51 
percent of the casualties from IEDs in 2015, the protection 
implications of this are significant in Somalia. There is cer-
tainly a strong argument for further research into what could 
be done to provide civilians with the knowledge and skills to 
avoid being caught up in an IED attack. While many recog-
nize that designing and implementing an effective education-
al program requires a thorough needs assessment to make 
informed programming decisions, this is problematic in the 
case of IED awareness.13 There are many risks associated with 
data-gathering on an active IED threat that do not apply to 
factory-manufactured mines or explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). This raises important questions from a protection 
perspective. 
In the context of south-central Somalia, information gath-
ering on vulnerabilities at the community level to an active 
IED threat is extremely sensitive and likely to be perceived 
by the local population as intelligence gathering on behalf of 
government or security forces. The perception that humani-
tarian organizations are affiliated with the government would 
call into question the neutrality and impartiality of the hu-
manitarian organization involved and could result in the 
organization and its staff being considered as legitimate tar-
gets for attack by AOGs. Humanitarian organizations should 
also be sensitive to the fact that, at this point, the IED threat 
in south-central Somalia is dealt with almost exclusively by 
state entities, which include the police, military, and intelli-
gence services. Consequently, despite altruistic and protective 
intentions, efforts by international organizations to gather 
information on these issues are likely to be treated with sus-
picion and even hostility by state actors.14 At the community 
level, anyone who is known or suspected to have provided in-
formation as part of such an assessment could be viewed as an 
informant. Considering that IED facilitators, as well as silent 
supporters of al-Shabaab live within the communities, there 
is a very real threat of retribution at the community level.15 
This analysis raises questions on whether it is possible to 
carry out information gathering on IEDs in south-central 
Somalia while upholding the principle of “do no harm.” In 
this context, DRC/DDG believes that employing participatory 
approaches to needs assessments—for example carrying out 
key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and indi-
vidual interviews with members of affected communities—has 
the potential to do great harm not only to the humanitarian 
organization but also to the beneficiary community. Hence, 
developing new methodologies and tools for analyzing the 
vulnerabilities of the civilian population to IEDs is prudent, 
and mine action organizations should avoid relying on those 
that have been used for traditional MRE needs assessments.
Implementing the IED Risk Education 
Awareness Campaign
If moving forward with an IED awareness campaign, orga-
nizations would do well to approach south-central Somalia’s 
situation with methodologies, messages, and materials that 
are specific to IEDs as opposed to those that are effective for 
traditional MRE.16 First and foremost, pictures of IEDs serve 
little purpose due to the fact that the manner in which IEDs 
are deployed implies that they remain hidden or disguised. If 
information regarding the appearance of IEDs or the context 
The Nasa Hablood Hotel.
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where they are placed is disseminated in communities, the 
groups that fabricate these weapons will potentially react by 
changing the devices’ appearance, components, and locations. 
Another risk involved in using pictures of IEDs is that every-
thing could potentially look like an IED. This would inevitably 
contribute to an unnecessary fear of everyday objects among 
the civilian population and intensify the psychological suffer-
ing already experienced by the Somali population.
Similarly, while significant work was done to develop 
IED awareness curricula for military personnel deployed in 
conf lict-affected environments, this information may not 
be appropriate for civilian audiences. For military person-
nel, IED awareness may delve into detail of how an IED is 
constructed and deployed, which is intended to supplement 
what they know about tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
This is reminiscent of the early days of mine action, when 
beneficiaries were provided with irrelevant information, 
e.g., the name of the weapon, the amount of explosive inside, 
and the functioning principle by which the mine operated. 
In the case of landmines and ERW, these unnecessary de-
tails were eventually deemed inappropriate and discarded. 
However, at this stage, the humanitarian community pres-
ently runs the risk of repeating the same mistakes in ad-
dressing IED-related threats.
Humanitarian organizations who share this level of detail 
with civilian audiences in south-central Somalia may inadver-
tently encourage people to approach suspected IEDs or, worse 
still, try to move them to protect others.17 Moreover, experi-
ence from counter-IED efforts illustrate that IED users regu-
larly adapt their emplacement or targeting methods to thwart 
counter-IED measures. The implication of this for IED aware-
ness is that materials and messages could quickly become ir-
relevant as the nature of IEDs evolve. Finally, if humanitarian 
organizations are seen disseminating information on how to 
make IEDs and how they work at the community-level, seri-
ous questions may be asked by the host government as to the 
purpose of educating people on this.
All educational activities on IEDs for civilians in south-
central Somalia should therefore focus on what the civilian 
population needs to know, which is distinctly different from 
that of military personnel. IED awareness at the community- 
level must emphasize improving situational awareness and 
the ability to recognize the IED indicators as well as those 
of an imminent attack. Depending on the results of the risk 
assessment, sessions could elaborate on the typical scenari-
os in which civilians become casualties and on what to do if 
civilians come across a suspected IED, are in the proximity of 
an explosion, or are caught in gunfire following an explosion. 
Asking the civilian population to “report” IEDs in a context 
like south-central Somalia is inappropriate. 
Looking Toward the Future
This article (1) explores the concerns relating to any edu-
cational activities on IEDs for the civilian population, with 
a particular focus on south-central Somalia. This article also 
discusses (2) the challenges that exist for humanitarian or-
ganizations wishing to plan and implement IED awareness 
successfully whilst upholding the principle of “do no harm.” 
Furthermore, the article argues that (3) there is a need to rec-
ognize that civilian-focused educational activities on IEDs 
must be approached with methodologies, materials, and mes-
sages specific to these devices. 
The case of south-central Somalia is used to highlight the 
fact that despite the high number of civilian casualties and the 
altruistic intentions behind engaging in IED awareness, if ap-
propriate risk-mitigation strategies are not in place, related 
activities have the potential to do real and long-lasting harm 
to organizations and beneficiaries. As a result, supplementing 
the necessary tools and best practices in dealing with IEDs is 
vital for the safety and effectiveness of mine action work in 
current conflict environments. A new Technical Note on 
Mine Action is a sound first step in this direction; however, to 
ensure that they “do no harm” the issue will require organiza-
tions to proceed with caution. 
See endnotes page 64
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The Early Years of Demining in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina:  
Transfer to National Ownership
by Ian Mansfield
After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on 14 December 1995, the newly formed Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested 
that the United Nations set up and manage a mine clearance 
program. However, it soon became clear that the government 
should take responsibility and ownership of the program. 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place between 
April 1992 and October 1995. While the causes of the war and 
what happened are extremely complicated, Bosnian Serbs en-
circled Sarajevo and imposed a blockade, while ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’ operations were undertaken by all sides in towns and 
villages throughout the country.
As a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, the fighting 
stopped, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain one coun-
try; however, it was divided into two entities: the Republika 
Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation. The country was 
to be governed by the Council of Ministers, consisting of one 
representative each from the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, 
and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). These representatives would 
share the presidency on a rotating basis, and elections were to 
be held to elect a parliament. Each entity was allowed to keep 
its own army, but a large, international military force called 
the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was deployed throughout the 
country to enforce the peace.
The Landmine Problem
As the fighting was intended to drive people out of their 
homes, landmines were used extensively throughout the con-
flict to keep people away from villages. Large, front-line areas 
developed along the boundaries between different ethnic 
groups, and mines were also laid in vast numbers to protect 
these areas.
The majority of the known minefields in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were located along the 1,000 km (621 mi) long 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line, which divided Republika Srpska. 
The Muslim Croat Federation Records of over 18,000 mine-
fields were available but toward the end of the war, many 
mines were laid without being recorded, and it was estimat-
ed that these maps represented only 50 to 60 percent of the 
minefields in the country. At the time when the Dayton Peace 
Accords came into effect, many believed that there could be 
up to one million landmines laid in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
along with an unknown number of unexpoloded ordnance 
(UXO) waiting to be cleared. Accurate casualty figures were 
difficult to obtain, but there seemed to be general agreement 
that about 50 civilians were killed or injured by landmines or 
UXO every month since the end of the war in 1995.1
Initial Response
In January 1996, the fledgling Bosnian government request-
ed United Nations’ assistance with setting up a mine action 
program. The responsibility fell to the United Nations Mission 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which established the 
Ian Mansfield stands in front of damaged apartments in Sarajevo. 
Photo courtesy of the author.
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United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) in June 
1996. As part of the transition of the mine action program 
to national ownership, a rather complex set of organizational 
changes were agreed upon by the Council of Ministers and 
the United Nations in October 1997. Responsibility for the 
mine action program was planned to transfer from UNMIBH 
to the government on 1 January 1998. However, the govern-
ment was not ready, and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) took over the interim responsibility. 
The government set up the Commission for Demining, the 
role of which was to keep the Council of Ministers informed 
on the progress of demining in the country, to approve na-
tional mine action plans and standards, and to oversee the 
work of UNMAC. The Commission for Demining consisted 
of three members: a Bosnian Serb, a Bosnian Croat, and a 
Bosniak; and they effectively performed the role of the na-
tional mine action authority.
UNMAC would transition to become the Bosnia 
Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) and it would be 
responsible for managing all central database records, setting 
priorities and issuing task orders, overseeing quality man-
agement or standards of work being done, and raising funds. 
The Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation 
would set up their own offices to supervise and undertake 
mine clearance.
Mine Clearance Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina
However, UNMAC was not the only program in the coun-
try. Beginning in 1996, foreign governments began bilat-
eral support for demining in Bosnia, with Norway funding 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). As the first civilian organi-
zation to work in Bosnia, NPA focused on clearing impor-
tant infrastructure projects, cultural heritage monuments, 
and damaged houses and apartments in support of refugee 
settlement programs in Sarajevo. The German government 
funded the trial of two demining machines, and a German 
bomb disposal school trained Bosnian refugees in Germany. 
The Belgium government funded two technical advisers to the 
Demining Commission.
In 1997, via the entity governments, the World Bank fi-
nanced mine clearance operations by international commer-
cial companies, all of whom had established subcontracts 
or joint venture arrangements with local commercial mine 
clearance companies. This was the first time the World Bank 
had funded mine clearance work, and it was not without its 
difficulties. Over US$10 million was made available to com-
mercial companies, leading to the sudden formation of 40 lo-
cal companies.
Fourteen contracts were awarded, but the majority of the 
money went through two international companies: MineTech 
and RONCO. Both were reputable companies and had es-
tablished partnerships with some Bosnian companies, one 
for each of the three ethnic groups. However, in early 1998, 
MineTech pulled out of Bosnia, and—due to a disagreement 
with the World Bank—the United States withdrew its funds 
from the World Bank and gave the money directly to RONCO.
A debate occurred regarding the merits of using commer-
cial companies for mine clearance as opposed to nonprofit or-
ganizations, like nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or 
government agencies. The pro-commercial argument was that 
commercial companies were more efficient because they were 
in a competitive environment. The counter-argument was that 
commercial companies only assumed easy tasks, and it was al-
leged that the local Bosnian companies cut corners and com-
promised on safety to keep their costs down. On the other 
hand, the NGOs said that they focused on house clearance, 
which was slow but necessary in Bosnia, as refugees needed 
to be able to return home. The various commercial companies 
and NGOs endeavored to produce figures to estimate their 
clearance costs per square meter. However, it is the author’s 
opinion that the figures were neither accurate nor convincing.
In the former Yugoslavia, a government body called the 
Civil Protection Organization (CPO) dealt with natural disas-
ters like fires and floods, and was also responsible for civil-
ian bomb disposal. In Bosnia, the CPO still existed albeit in a 
much weakened state. It fell under the purview of the Ministry 
of Defence, which made it difficult for the United Nations and 
World Bank to engage with the organization. In 1997, the 
European Union decided to support the CPO, funding train-
ing and providing equipment and vehicles for 12 mine clear-
ance teams and nine bomb disposal teams. In the urgency to 
get things moving in Bosnia, little thought went into project 
Norwegian People’s Aid deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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sustainability. In early 1998, 
the CPO could not afford to 
take on the teams who were 
trained. As a result, hun-
dreds of deminers were laid 
off, and equipment sat idle 
while waiting for more funds 
from the European Union.
Frustrated at the slow pace 
of house clearance in Bosnia, 
the United Nations Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) decid-
ed to fund its own clearance 
teams. In 1997, UNHCR 
trained and equipped a total 
of 240 deminers. These teams worked on house and apartment 
clearance in the two entities, but it was agreed that the project 
would come under the overall umbrella of the national pro-
gram.
Finally, under the Dayton Peace Accords, the respective 
armies of the two entities were required to undertake mine 
clearance work. Under the supervision of the international 
military contingents from SFOR, if the entity armies under-
took certain tasks like mine clearance, they earned credits, 
which allowed them access to funding, new weapons, or cer-
tain training opportunities. The entity armies had previously 
undertaken what they called “mine lifting” tasks, which in-
volved using a minefield map to remove only the mines that 
were marked on the map.  Sadly, as the work was undertak-
en by recently conscripted troops who did not check for any 
additional mines outside the mine lanes that may have been 
laid subsequently, there were a high number of injuries and 
deaths. No central records were kept of this work, and no 
one was confident that the areas involved were completely 
cleared. While the entity armies certainly had the potential 
to speed up the national mine clearance effort, this seemed to 
be a wasted endeavor.
Transition Process
Although the Commission for Demining was notionally the 
government authority in charge of all mine action, it only had 
varying influence over the seven different groups or projects 
outlined. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government was 
weak, and a range of significant mine clearance activities were 
already underway without any coherent national plan in place. 
At the coordination level, there were only a few Bosnians in 
the BHMAC who had been identified as suitable to take over 
management roles.
The demining commissioners said they did not think that 
the government could meet the 1 July 1998 deadline for the 
transition of the mine action program from United Nations to 
government control. In many ways, the government was not 
ready; however, it had to be done. At the next Commission for 
Demining meeting in May 1998, UNDP announced that the 
handover would take place as planned on 1 July 1998, without 
the possibility for an extension.
To assist with the handover, the ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
National Mine Action Plan – 1998’ was developed with the 
cooperation of the World Bank and European Union. The 
program aimed to reduce the number of civilian landmine 
and UXO casualties, clear houses for returning refugees 
and internally displaced persons, and make land safe for 
agriculture, reconstruction, and development activities. The 
key elements of the plan detailed the transition to government 
control and outlined what the U.N. components would do. 
The amount of confirmed or pledged funding came to US$18 
million total for 1998. With another $22 million requested, 
this total amounted to US$40 million for the year. Deminers’ 
salary costs were one of the main reasons for the large figures. 
In Afghanistan and Laos, deminers were paid US$100 per 
month. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the European 
cost of living, the rate was around US$800 per month.
As the Dayton Peace Accords attracted significant interna-
tional attention, many high-level visitors came to see the mine 
clearance work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most famous 
visitor was Diana, Princess of Wales, who visited the U.N. 
Mine Action Centre in Sarajevo in early August 1997, just 
weeks before her death. Other notable visitors at the time in-
cluded Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, and the head of UNHCR, 
Mrs. Sadako Ogata.
Preparing for the Handover
In preparation for the handover of responsibility, a two-day 
workshop was arranged at the Marshall Tito Barracks from 
11 to 12 June 1998. Over 100 demining supervisors from a va-
riety of organizations from the two entities attended. Getting 
people into Sarajevo from all over the country involved de-
tailed logistical planning, and U.N. vehicles were dispatched 
to ensure safe passage for many attendees.
The meeting went extremely well. The participants, many 
of whom were former combatants who had probably fought 
against each other, discussed technical issues cordially. Despite 
political tension amongst participants, the meeting was a suc-
cess overall and helped clarify the national program’s way for-
ward. Because of its technical nature and obvious benefits to 
Diana, Princess of Wales,  
at the Bosnian Mine Action  
Centre.
Photo courtesy of J.J. Van der Merwe.
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communities, the mine action sector showed that it could be 
part of the peace-building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The use of the Bosnian entity armies in mine clearance was 
another issue that needed to be addressed. These armies were 
a huge, under-utilized resource with the capacity to provide 
future clearance. The military had previously resisted taking 
tasking orders from a civilian body or having their work in-
spected by civilians. As the team leaders’ meeting involved 
some personnel from the entity armies, they left with a bet-
ter understanding of the national program. Following subse-
quent meetings with entity armies, SFOR representatives, and 
donors, significant agreements were reached.
The international military contingents from SFOR agreed 
to train and equip the entity army deminers according to 
the new international standards, and the United States an-
nounced that they would set up three training centers. The 
entity armies agreed to accept clearance tasks from BHMAC 
and to allow civilian inspectors to accredit army units and 
check their work. Due to civilian sensitivities remaining 
from the militaries’ actions during the war, the military 
would focus on clearing areas around military bases, air-
fields, and industrial sites, as opposed to clearing houses. The 
one sticking point was extra insurance to cover the army de-
miners, but Canada and Norway agreed to provide funds to 
cover these costs.
Local candidates were identified to head the new BHMAC, 
entity centers, and other key posts within the offices. However, 
quite a few positions would still have to be filled by U.N. staff, 
and there would be a reliance on donor funding for many 
years to come.
Ian Mansfield AM CSC 
Mine Action Consultant
Ian Mansfield has worked in mine action 
for the past 25 years. Between 1991 and 
1998 he was the United Nations program 
manager in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and 
Laos. Mansfield then worked as the UNDP 
mine action team leader in New York 
for four years, followed by nine years 
as the Deputy Director of the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He now 
works as a consultant based from his home in Australia and recent-
ly published Stepping into a Minefield about his experiences in the 
early days of mine action.
on
https://issuu.com/cisr-journal
Transition Ceremony
On 1 July 1998, a day of ceremonies marked the handover, 
as the United Nations transitioned ownership of the BHMAC 
to the government, and the new Bosnian managers were 
sworn in. The entity armies were to sign agreements that fell 
under the umbrella of the national program, but at the last 
minute, some alleged inequality was raised that halted pro-
ceedings. The signature of these agreements eventually took 
place on 6 July 1998. The transition to national ownership of 
the mine action program was complete—at the political level 
at least. 
See endnotes page 64
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Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
ITF Enhancing Human Security Perspective  
20 Years After the Conflict
by Gregor Sančcˇanin [ ITF Enhancing Human Security ]
ITF Enhancing Human Security has worked in Southeast 
Europe’s post-conflict countries since 1998. In states affected 
by the break-up of Yugoslavia such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
ITF works to support the country’s fulfillment of the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).1
With a history of nationalistic antagonisms, a series of 
armed conflicts, secessions, and major political and state 
structural reforms stemming back to the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, the history of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) is intertwined with the history of religious 
and ethnic groups in that area. 
By the early 1990s, rising ethnic tensions led to an outbreak 
of armed clashes as the Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia seceded from 
the SFRY. Today, some of the former SFRY republics are still 
contaminated with high concentrations of landmines and un-
exploded ordnance (UXO), Bosnia and Herzegovina being the 
most heavily affected in the region.2
Historical Context 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of sovereignty in 
October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence 
A deminer and mine detection dog enter a minefield above the town of Konjic. 
All photos courtesy of ITF Enhancing Human Security.
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from the former SFRY in February 1992.3 Three and a half 
years after the ethnic- and religious-based armed conflicts in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina began in April 1992, a peace agree-
ment was reached on 21 November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, and 
officially signed in Paris, France, on 15 December 1995, bring-
ing years of interethnic civil strife to an end.4 The Dayton 
Peace Accords  retained Bosnia and Herzegovina’s interna-
tional boundaries and created a joint, multi-ethnic and dem-
ocratic government, the state itself being composed of two 
largely autonomous constitutional and legal entities.5,6
Mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in 1996, 
with the establishment of the United Nations Mine Action 
Centre (UNMAC), created for the purpose of building a lo-
cal management structure and operational mine action ca-
pacity. All available minefield records were gathered through 
SFOR, and a central minefield database was established as a 
basic tool for further planning.7 During the initial years, de-
mining operational activities were conducted mainly through 
U.N. and World Bank programs, with the engagement of a va-
riety of international commercial and nongovernment orga-
nizations (NGO). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the APMBC on 3 December 
1997 and ratified it on 8 September 1998. In July 1998, na-
tional structures took over more responsibility for demin-
ing activities, but still with continued financial, expertise, 
and technical assistance from the international community. 
At the time two mine action entities were established, namely 
the Republic of Srpska Mine Action Centre (RSMAC) and the 
Federation Mine Action Centre (FMAC), as well as the joint 
coordination center: Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action 
Center (BHMAC). The APMBC came into force on 1 March 
1999 with obligations on Bosnia and Herzegovina to clear all 
known mined areas by March 2009. 
In 2002, the central structure was established at the state 
level, and the BHMAC—until then only a coordination body—
was authorized by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Foreign agen-
cies initially implemented humanitarian demining activities, 
but the process of building local capacities was underway. At 
that time, the main responsibility and authority was that of 
the Council of Ministers and both entity governments, which 
ensured coordination, improvement, planning, and recording 
of mine action programs.
The Demining Commission and Ministry of Civil Affairs 
prepared the first demining law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was adopted by parliament in February 2002.8 The 
adoption of the law helped to make demining a priority in 
the country.9  In the same year, the first Mine Action Strategy 
was made for the period of 2002 to 2009, significantly improv-
ing the functionality of the structure, quality assurance, and 
the effectiveness of the overall process. At the end of 2004, an 
evaluation of the program concluded that the vision of the first 
strategy was too optimistic and the size and complexity of the 
A deminer checks the soil for a potential mine in the ground in Konjic municipality.
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problem greatly exceeded available funding, technology, and 
general support to implement the program. The adoption of a 
revised Mine Action Strategy for the period of 2005 to 2009 
introduced a more realistic approach. At the same time, the 
Council of Ministers made a decision to start the preparation 
of a new strategic document for the period of 2009 to 2019, 
which would provide the basis for an extension of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s APMBC clearance deadline. 
Previous experience indicates a significant discrepancy be-
tween needs for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
realistic funding and technical possibilities. The Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 was adopted by 
the State Ministry Council on 24 April 2008.10 Nevertheless, 
considering the extent of the mine and UXO contamination, 
the available funding for its resolution, and the slow pace of 
clearance activities, it is clear that a new amended demining 
strategy with a new deadline beyond 2019 will need to be ad-
opted in the near future. 
Contamination
The presence of mines and UXO in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
will continue to be a priority for years to come. Threatening 
the physical safety of its residents, this contamination is an 
obstacle for country reconstruction, economic develop-
ment, social society building, and the overall human secu-
rity environment. Demining is an initial precondition for 
reconstruction and development projects, their successful 
implementation, and for the safe return of refugees and dis-
placed persons. 
Commercial companies, NGOs, the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Armed Forces demining battalion, and entities’ 
Civil Protection demining teams are the four officially rec-
ognized categories of operators directly involved in the mine 
clearance process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Demining 
Commission requires that all demining agents be accredited 
by BHMAC prior to receiving approval to work in the country. 
In 2016, BHMAC accredited 27 operators to conduct human-
itarian demining operations and monitoring in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the majority of which are national and locally- 
based organizations.11 
The initial estimation after the survey executed in 1996 in-
dicated the mine and UXO suspected land-surface area was 
around 4,200 sq km (1,622 sq mi), presumably containing 
A deminer digs the soil in search of mines amidst the steep for-
est area in Doboj municipality.
The view over a minefield during a presentation in Konjic.
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up to approximately 1 million mines and UXO.12 Currently, 
there is 1,118 sq km (442 sq mi) of suspected hazardous areas, 
which accounts for 2.2 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
total land area.13 Based on BHMAC systematic survey oper-
ations, it is estimated that 81,000 mines and explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) are spread throughout 9,018 locations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of the suspected hazardous areas, 
7.3 sq km (2.8 sq mi) spread over approximately 200 locations 
is believed to contain approximately 2,000 cluster sub- 
munitions.14 Lives and livelihoods of an estimated 545,600 
local residents are still directly affected by mines, UXO, and 
cluster munitions, while 1,398 communities in 129 towns 
and municipalities are identified and defined as impacted.15,16 
Since 1996, there have been 1,742 mine/UXO victims, includ-
ing 608 fatalities.17 Thus far, approximately 61,440 anti-per-
sonnel mines, 8,380 anti-tank mines, and 54,930 UXO were 
found and removed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 
Based on assessment of the residual mine problem, the gen-
eral impact of landmines has been significantly reduced, and 
as much as realistically possible, in accordance with strategic 
goals, financial, operational, and resource planning. However, 
the May 2014 floods caused additional setbacks, complicating 
implementation plans for 2014 and halting prospective strat-
egy planning for the future. 
 
Floods of 2014 
The May 2014 floods were the worst in the last 120 years, 
causing massive damage in the northern, eastern, and cen-
tral parts of the country that border Croatia and Serbia. 
Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina was still recovering 
from consequences of the 1992–1995 armed clashes, where 
much of the population continued to suffer from poverty and 
unemployment. The natural disaster affected 25-to-33 per-
cent of the state territory and approximately one million peo-
ple, with severe damage to urban, industrial, and rural areas. 
Electricity and clean water were unavailable for days and, in 
some cases, weeks. Many houses, infrastructure, schools, hos-
pitals, private facilities, and farms were completely destroyed. 
This caused a deterioration of public services, local econo-
mies, and agriculture activities.19,20 
Initial concerns were raised about massive mine displace-
ment as an estimated 70 percent of the flooded area was in 
or around mine contaminated areas.21,22 Fortunately, the 
A mine detection dog team operates in steep forest terrain in 
Doboj municipality.
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final recovery needs assessment concluded that the original 
mine migration was relatively small compared to initial esti-
mates. Unfortunately, the fencing and warning signs around 
many minefields were destroyed and urgently needed to be re-
placed to avoid additional casualties. Landslides caused fur-
ther mine migration within suspected hazardous areas as well, 
which meant that mines and UXO in some cases became more 
deeply buried in the soil. For this reason, areas needed to be 
resurveyed, re-marked, remapped, and in some cases even re-
cleared.23 Local populations in the flooded areas needed to be 
constantly informed of the additional mine/UXO risk. 
The initial estimation of the floods’ affected area consist-
ed of approximately 920 sq km (355.2 sq mi), which included 
more than 3,000 landslide locations, prompting a landmine 
awareness campaign to make the local population and re-
lief workers aware of the dangers from mines and UXO that 
may have been unearthed or repositioned by water erosion 
and landslide subsidence. From the initial 920 sq km (355.2 
sq mi) of flooded areas, approximately 300 sq km (115.8 sq mi) 
was further assessed to be potentially in mine affected areas.24 
BHMAC also identified that approximately 105 sq km (40.5 
sq mi) of the flooded area could potentially contain mines 
and UXO that migrated from the suspected hazardous areas. 
Within that 105 sq km (40.5 sq mi), a total of 40 sq km (15 sq 
mi) was finally designated suspected hazardous areas.25 The 
2014 floods therefore additionally burdened and delayed the 
demining process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
ITF Support in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Established by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia 
in March 1998, the initial purpose of ITF was to assist Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords by providing assistance and support for post-conflict 
rehabilitation.26, 27
By the end of 2016, more than 77 sq km (47 sq mi) of land 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was demined through more than 
2,444 ITF projects, removing over 20,830 mines and almost 
18,000 items of UXO.28,29,30  ITF has also provided rehabil-
itation to 829 mine accident survivors, provided mine risk 
education (MRE) to over 180,000 children and adults, and 
secured socioeconomic support projects for over 5,000 mine 
accident survivors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Future Challenges 
Bosnia and Herzegovina undergoes a steady, albeit slow de-
mining progress. One must understand that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has highly complex political and decision- 
making systems. Demining is of crucial importance for all 
spheres of daily life as well as the national development strat-
egy. Hence, the realpolitik should unanimously define nation-
al needs, ensuring a better future for coming generations. 
See endnotes page 64
A mine detection dog works in a forest situated in minefields in Šamac municipality.
Gregor Sančanin
Head of Representative Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina
ITF Enhacing Human Security 
Gregor Sančanin is head of the ITF Enhancing Human Securi-
ty Representative Office in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. From 2003 to 2011, 
Sančanin was the project manager for 
Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia at ITF. 
He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
English and Literature from Faculty of 
Arts and is pursuing a Master of Science 
degree in Social Sciences at the Faculty 
of Social Sciences, both from the Uni-
versity of Ljubljana-Slovenia. Prior to working in the humanitar-
ian mine action sector he worked for seven years in the Slovenian 
news, media, and television broadcasting sector. 
28
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol21/iss1/1
Field Notes
29ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016
Public, Private, and Civil 
Sector Partnerships Bolster 
Humanitarian Demining Efforts
by Bob Ebberson and Wendy Hart [ Schonstedt Instrument Company ]
Schonstedt Instrument Company is a small manu-facturing company located in the eastern panhan-dle of West Virginia, about 70 miles (112 km) from 
Washington, D.C. Schonstedt makes instruments that locate 
underground objects. These include pipe, cable, and magnet-
ic locators that find and trace underground utilities and fer-
rous metals such as boundary markers used by surveyors. 
Magnetic locators have proven to be successful in locating 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosive remnants 
of war (ERW). In looking for ways to grow this market, 
Schonstedt recognized an opportunity to support humanitar-
ian demining throughout the world. Determining that the sale 
of a pipe and cable locator would financially support the dona-
tion of a magnetic locator, Schonstedt implemented a program 
in 2007 that would be sustainable over time and created the 
Schonstedt Humanitarian Demining Initiative.
Needing partners who could identify and prioritize pop-
ulations for which clearance would otherwise be impossible 
without a donation, Schonstedt partnered with the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). To date, UNMAS 
UNMAS assesses explosive threats at a future MINUSMA campsite in Gao, Mali, February 2014.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS.
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UNMAS assesses explosive threats at a Malian army camp in Timbukktu, December 2013.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS.
An operator with The Development Initiative uses a magnetic locator to conduct battle area clearance activity at the Malian army 
camp in Timbukktu, December 2013.
Photo courtesy of UNMAS.
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has facilitated the donation of 508 tools (priced at US$1,041 
each) to U.N.-supported deminers in 26 countries, includ-
ing but not limited to Algeria, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, 
Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gaza, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Nepal, Somalia, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and the 
Darfur region of Sudan. The Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) has also assisted in 
identifying areas most in need of support. Together with 
UNMAS in New York, Schonstedt Instrument Company 
equipped U.N.-supported humanitarian demining teams in 
locations that would not otherwise have benefited from mine 
clearance. This expanded capacity meant fewer losses of lives 
and limbs, and contributed to the vision of a mine-free world.
The Mechanics
The program evolved over time. Initially, one magnetic loca-
tor was set aside for every sale of a pipe and cable locator. A 
Schonstedt partner might put in a request for 20 units to be 
sent to Cambodia and provide a point of contact there. To evi-
dence a true need and encourage a shared stake in the process, 
Schonstedt required that recipients bear the cost of shipping. 
On receipt of those funds, the donated equipment would ship.
As the program became more prominent, individuals be-
gan approaching Schonstedt, wishing to contribute to the 
effort. They asked if they could buy a magnetic locator and do-
nate it. In response, Schonstedt modified the program so that 
whenever someone donated a magnetic locator, it would result 
in a one-to-one match by Schonstedt, 
thereby allowing two locators to be do-
nated in that person’s name. The donor 
base has grown to include associa-
tions, businesses, church groups, ser-
vice clubs, and individuals, all of whom 
appreciate the fact that 100 percent 
of their contributions go to shipping 
equipment directly to trained hu-
manitarian deminers in the field, with 
Schonstedt absorbing all administra-
tive costs. Individual donors from the 
Religious Society of Friends donated 
three of the 10 units sent to Tajikistan 
and provided funding for 24 units to 
Vietnam. Donors are recognized with 
letters of appreciation from Schonstedt, 
UNMAS, PM/WRA, and the in- 
country recipient of the equipment 
whenever possible, e.g., the Croatian 
Mine Action Centre or the International Mine Action 
Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Schonstedt locators have contributed to clearance opera-
tions in numerous countries. For instance, the Tajikistan 
Mine Action Centre reported finding complete cluster bombs, 
each containing hundreds of submunitions. Most were bro-
ken open and their contents relocated down the mountain. 
In one gulley, ten submunitions were found by eye, while an-
other seventeen were found using the donated detectors. And 
as reported by the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan 
(MAPA) and The HALO Trust, over 80 tons of ammunition 
Figure 1. Between 2007 and 2016, the Schonstedt Humanitarian Demining Initiative 
deployed more than 500 donated locators to more than 20 countries in need.
Figure courtesy of Schonstedt Instrument Company.
The Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) employed the 
Schonstedt GA-72Cd locators on clearance projects along 
the power line in eastern Croatia near the Osijek city in very 
difficult terrain.
Photo courtesy of CROMAC.
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are destroyed in Afghanistan each month. Schonstedt loca-
tors play a part in the location and destruction of these ex-
plosive items. 
Many of those who donate to Schonstedt are reoccurring 
donors and welcome the opportunity to make a difference in 
the lives of people they will never meet. In addition, employees 
of Schonstedt have the satisfaction of knowing that what they 
do on a daily basis has a far reaching effect and contributes to 
the well-being of others in some of the world’s most mine- 
contaminated countries. 
Daniel Craig, U.N. Global Advocate for the Elimination of Mines and Explosive Hazards, demonstrates the use of the Schonstedt mag-
netic locator.
Photo courtesy of the U.N Photo/Manuel Elias.
Bob Ebberson
Director of Business Development
Wendy Hart
Director of Marketing and Business Development
Schonstedt Instrument Company
Email: whart@schonstedt.com
Website: www.schonstedt.com/shdi
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World War II Coastal Minefields 
in the United Kingdom
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
While not widely appreciated today, there were once 1,997 minefields in the United Kingdom con-
taining between 338,500–350,000 landmines.1 If you were 
to walk today on a beach suitable for amphibious landing 
on either the south or east coasts of the United Kingdom, 
chances are that you would be walking on a former 1940s 
minefield. This article briefly explores the story of the United 
Kingdom’s coastal minefields, from their hasty installation 
through their costly clearance. Many of the lessons from this 
period remain relevant today, as countries seek to apply land 
release principles to reduce the risk of explosive contamina-
tion to tolerable levels.
In June 1940, the U.K. government believed it faced the 
imminent threat of invasion. The authorities immediate-
ly began fortifying the ports and potential landing beach-
es alongside inland defensible features. The British Army 
had lost equipment during the Battle of France and would 
have possibly struggled to defend a long and exposed coast-
line had Operation Sealion, the German invasion plan, been 
launched.2 Fortifications and obstacles were seen as a means 
of evening the balance against what was feared would be an 
irresistible blitzkrieg invasion force. In such circumstances, 
many minefields were laid in great haste. The Corps of Royal 
Engineers Journal states that “the laying of minefields was the 
first large scale practical experience the British Army had had 
in this branch of warfare. Lack of experience, and hurried 
operation, led to many mistakes being made which were to 
cause much trouble to units and members of the Corps later.”3
Minefields were typically combined with other obsta-
cles such as wire entanglements, scaffolding, dragon’s teeth 
to destroy landing craft, anti-tank ditches, and anti-tank 
blocks. Some—but by no means all—minefields were to be 
covered by machine gun fire, usually from a protected pill-
box or a trench system. Around 28,000 pillboxes were built 
in Britain in 1940 alone.4 
A number of different mines were used in 1940. These in-
cluded the B Type C from Royal Navy stores that contained 
11.4 kg (25.1 lbs) of explosive, usually Amatol. The B stood for 
beach mine, although the mines were sometimes colloquially 
referred to as mushroom mines. While the mine had enough 
explosive to destroy a tank or a vehicle, it could also be ini-
tiated by a person. This mine required as little as 22.7 kg (50 
lbs) of weight to initiate the fuze, which consisted of a striker 
separated from a cartridge primer by a simple bow-shaped 
spring. The bow spring was prone to becoming weaker as 
the mine corroded, often making the mine more sensitive to 
pressure. The device effectively functioned as both an anti-
personnel and anti-tank mine. The B Type C mine would be-
come infamous during the subsequent clearance efforts. 
A soldier based in Suffolk in August 1942 remembers “I 
was attached to the Essex Regiment. We were involved in lay-
ing mines from the Minsmere Sluice to where the power sta-
tion is now. We would dig a round hole and put in it a sort of 
Figure 1. B Type C mine.
Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum.
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biscuit tin with a hole in it. Into that you would put the deto-
nator, then gently replace the lid, and very gently cover the 
mine with sand. We meticulously marked every spot we put 
a mine on a map, so that they could be lifted later. Both sides 
of the belt of mines were protected by wire to prevent people 
straying into the area accidentally. Sometimes a sheep would 
get through the wire and would be blown up.”5
Generally the Royal Engineers were tasked with laying, cor-
doning, and recording minefields. For example, the War Diary 
for 558 Field Company, Royal Engineers for November 1940 re-
cords that “nearly 2700 A/T Mines MK1V were laid, armed, and 
mapped, protected, and carefully recorded.” The same phrase 
is used for 4,500 mushrooms (B Type C mines) and 30 RE No.1 
Mines.6 While effort was taken to fence off minefields and re-
cord mine locations accurately, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that this practice was not as universal as desired. Inaccuracies 
in record keeping, combined with changes caused by the tides, 
inhibited some of the later clearance efforts. 
Some of the minefields in which this Essex Regiment soldier 
worked are visible in Figure 3, page 35. Figures 4, 5, and 6 (pag-
es 35 and 36) show where the minefield from Figure 2 would have 
been in 1945 prior to removal and what is there today: the largest 
nuclear power station in the United Kingdom.
Some efforts were made to improve on the hasty minefield 
laying as early as late 1940. When properly planned and ex-
ecuted, beach minefields would be laid above the high water 
mark, and mines would be secured in place by recovery wires. 
Recovery wires linked mines and held them in place, assisting 
later clearance efforts greatly. Clearance of minefields without 
recovery wires would often prove problematic, since mines 
would be more prone to migration.
In the autumn of 1940, the 125th Infantry Brigade took over 
a stretch of Suffolk’s coastal defense. They noted that “mines 
have also been placed on the beaches, but the sea sucks them 
out to sea up to 50 yards out from the mine fields as marked 
on the maps. Anywhere near the sea side of the mine fields is 
dangerous. The mine fields are very well marked on the maps, 
but of course they are moved by the action of the sea.”9 
Sergeant Fred Hinton of the Royal Engineers remembers 
“just after Christmas (1940) we moved to Deal in Kent and 
billeted in empty boarding houses. My job, with a section of 
men, was to take up 2 rows of beach mines that had been laid 
in the shingle beach between Deal and Sandwich and replace 
them with 4 rows wired together and mapped. The 2 rows we 
picked up had been laid 7 paces apart one row staggered be-
hind the other. The land was sand dunes with sand leading 
Figure 2. B Type C mine rough schematic.
Figure courtesy of Military Training Pamphlet No 40, Anti Tank 
Mines 1940, War Office General Staff.
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Figure 3. A 1942 image of the minefields north of Sizewell on the Suffolk Coast, United Kingdom. 
Figure courtesy of The National Archives.
Figure 4 (left). A 1945 aerial view of Sizewell Nuclear Power Complex. Figure 5 (right). A 2014 aerial view of Sizewell Nuclear Power 
Complex. Both figures show the immediate coast to the north indicating the minefield from the 1942 diagram shown in Figure 3 and 
believed location of the minefield continuing to the south.7
Figures courtesy of Google Earth.
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down to a shingle beach… We lost 2 men early on before 
adopting a 3 mine distance rule. After that, we had a mini-
mum of men on the beach and those carrying the mines from 
the beach keeping well clear of the 2 finders. Each day a stretch 
of beach would be cleared and wired off, 4 rows dug and new 
mines laid, wired together and mapped. I was on the job for 
about 11 months. We took 3500 mines up and re-laid 7000. 
This was mainly on the beach of the Sandwich Golf Course.”10 
The Royal St. George’s Golf Club is now one of the courses 
used to host the Open Golf Championship.
Some of today’s major tourist attractions, even quintessen-
tial images of England, were mined. Cuckmere Haven on the 
Sussex coast is one such example. This beach has since been 
used in a number of Hollywood films. In 1940, an extensive 
system of pillboxes and anti-tank defenses overlooked six 
minefields containing 1,532 landmines (556 B Type C mines 
and 976 General Service anti-tank mines).11 The Cuckmere 
minefields claimed lives during the war. In September 1940, 
three Royal Engineers were killed by a B Type C at Cuckmere.12 
There were more casualties in 1942.13
Clearance of the U.K.’s minefields commenced in earnest in 
late 1943, once it seemed certain that the threat of a German 
invasion had receded. Clearance certificates were careful-
ly worded and plainly stated that mines were only removed 
from specified areas. Often certificates would end with a sub- 
heading titled “Opinion as to safety.” It is noteworthy that 
many certificates in the archive include the phrase “no guar-
antee can be given that the area may be considered safe.” 
Sometimes the “Opinion as to safety” noted that “the area 
may be considered safe except for the possibility of mines be-
ing washed up on to the beach from other minefields.”14
While few realize that Britain once had extensive mine-
fields, fewer know that significant casualties were sustained 
during the clearance efforts. The Corps of Royal Engineers 
History puts total casualties for all Bomb Disposal duties (in-
cluding mine clearance) in the United Kingdom during World 
War II at 55 officers and 339 other ranks killed, and 37 offi-
cers and 172 other ranks wounded.15 During the immediate 
post-war years, a further 151 Royal Engineers died clearing 
Britain’s beaches.16 To put that figure into context, the United 
Kingdom lost a total of 1,078 during the Korean War, and 255 
were killed in the Falklands War. Some estimates place the to-
tal number of fatalities that occurred on Britain’s beach mine-
fields at approximately 500 civilians and military personnel.17 
Figure 6. Instructions for laying beach mines, diagram 2. Method of connecting to recovery wires.
Figure courtesy Chief Royal Engineer, 44th Division.8
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Causalities continued into the 1950s. One notable incident oc-
curred in May 1955 in the town of Swanage in Dorset; five 
boys were killed after tampering with a mine that the coroner 
later stated likely washed up on shore. 
The minefield at Swanage was laid in 1940. A clearance 
operation of the relevant section was undertaken in 1945. It 
was repeated in 1947 and again in 1949. Eventually, a clear-
ance certificate was issued on 17 February 1950. The original 
minefield record and the subsequent clearance records show 
that 117 mines were originally laid, of which only five were 
lifted in clearance. There was some evidence of small craters 
where 54 other mines had been. Minefields consisting of B 
Type C mines were known to be prone to significant sympa-
thetic detonations; an animal initiating one mine could set off 
many more. The remaining 58 mines were unaccounted for. 
It is possible some of these mines were laid without recovery 
wires and may have washed away during the course of the war. 
One of the men who survived the incident, Robert Key, later 
became a Member of Parliament. During the debate on rati-
fying the Convention on Cluster Munitions in March 2010, he 
called for parts of the Dorset coast to be re-cleared. He noted 
that the officer in charge of the clearance task in 1950 had 
refused to issue a certificate of clearance but had been over-
ruled.18 Issues of liability and the difficult decisions involving 
risk assessment of challenging clearance sites are nothing new 
to mine action.
The rush to defend Britain’s coast in 1940 resulted in diffi-
culties in clearance from 1943 onwards. Even in 1940, Eastern 
Command reminded corps staff that “unless accurate records 
are kept of locations it will be impossible to recover mines 
on termination of hostilities, and many casualties during re-
covery will result.”19 Not only were accurate records required, 
but so too was the stringent use of recovery wires to prevent 
mines from moving. In 1945, the MP for Evesham was well 
aware of the problem and urged Prime Minister Atlee that 
“in various parts of the country some land mines have been 
overlooked, will he instruct the Service Departments to issue 
a questionnaire to serving and non-serving personnel ask-
ing them to notify any special knowledge they may have re-
garding the location of these undetected mines, in view of the 
danger to children and the general public?” It appears an evi-
dence based approach to survey of minefields is nothing new. 
The Prime Minister rejected the appeal and asked “wheth-
er [the] questionnaire suggested would provide any useful 
Figure 7. Cuckmere Haven from the west.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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Figure 8. Eastern Command Clearance 
Certificate No.76, April 1945. WO 199/98. 
Figure courtesy of The National Archives.
and reliable assistance. It is already the 
practice, where necessary, to seek fur-
ther evidence direct from the men who 
laid the mines. Such men can readily be 
traced through record offices and can 
be cross-examined on the spot.” He 
acknowledged that, “the location of 
mines is a difficult problem, particu-
larly as many may have been shifted 
by tides and soil movements, and, 
although the work is being actively 
pursued, I am afraid that complete 
clearance may take a long time.”20
As in other European countries, 
many prisoners of war (POW) 
were co-opted into the danger-
ous clearance efforts. In 1946, 
around 1,200 Ukrainian POWs 
were employed as deminers in 
the United Kingdom. Although 
all were eligible for repatria-
tion by 1948, some chose to 
stay as civilian employees of 
the Royal Engineers. By 1962, 
there were still 113 Ukrainian civilians 
working with the Royal Engineers in a unit called the Mixed 
Service Organisation. Some would remain working with the 
Royal Engineers into the 1980s. Innovative clearance meth-
ods were developed that included the use of bulldozers and 
water jets to move sand and even shingle. The water jets 
would expose mines and often detonate them. Ultimately, 
areas swept by this process would be subsequently searched 
by electronic detector. 
All mines used on Britain’s shores had a high metal con-
tent and were relatively easy to find if they were within the 
confines of the minefield perimeters. From late 1943 until 
late 1948, a total of 1,986 minefields consisting of 338,500 
mines were cleared, mostly by the Royal Engineers.22 
Eleven other more complex and difficult minefields were 
cleared by 1972.23 The last mined beach at Trimmingham in 
Norfolk was finally released to the public in 1972. In 2004, a 
memorial was unveiled nearby at Mundesley to commemo-
rate the 26 Royal Engineers killed while clearing the beaches 
in this area alone.
Figure 9. Royal Engineers make use of water jets while clearing 
Saunton Sands in Devon, 1947.21
Figure courtesy of British Pathe.
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Cleared minefields did not just return beaches to public 
use. By the 1960s, certain sites became nuclear power stations. 
Figures 12 and 13 (pages 40 and 41) show the minefields pro-
tecting Dungeness in December 1941. Part of that minefield 
ran straight through the current super structure of a nuclear 
power station.
While many efforts were made to clear minefields, the re-
sidual risk remained. In 1961, for example, a Royal Engineers 
Bomb Disposal Team was tasked to re-clear the beach at 
Sandgate near Folkestone, because the local council wished 
to replace the beach groynes (ocean shore barriers designed 
to limit the movement of sediment). A remaining B Type C 
mine was found. Such instances were relatively common. In 
June 1967, the Royal Navy had to re-clear an area of Slapton 
Sands in Devon of 32 anti-tank mines. The beach was origi-
nally cleared in 1948.25 The last recorded, deliberate clearance 
of B Type C mines was in Whitsand Bay in Cornwall in 1998. 
As late as December 2011, a beachcomber group on the beach 
Figure 10. Beach defenses near Aldeburgh in Suffolk, United Kingdom, photographed by the RAF on 17 December 1941 where B Type 
C mines are believed to have exploded.
Figure courtesy of Historic England RAF Photography.
Figure 11. The memorial to the Royal Engineers who died clear-
ing minefields near Mundesley, Norfolk, United Kingdom.
Figure courtesy of Tour Norfolk.
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at Seaford just west of Cuckmere Haven called the police 
having found a very weathered B Type C mine.26 Other in-
stances are relatively frequent.27 For instance, landmines 
have been found in fishermen’s nets.28 
In February 2014, the U.K. Ministry of Defence replied 
to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request that asked for 
“details of WW2 beach minefields for North East Scotland, 
either maps or clearance certificates from post war demin-
ing.” The Army Secretariat rejected the FOI on the basis 
that certain individuals might attempt “to locate and un-
earth these munitions, potentially leading to serious harm 
to themselves and others in the vicinity.” Interestingly, 
the secretariat added that “another consideration is that 
the accuracy of this information is not guaranteed, nor is 
it considered comprehensive.”29 It would appear that the 
implications of the hasty installment of minefields on 
the U.K. coastline remain with us and are relevant today.
In October 2015, a suspected landmine washed ashore in 
Aberdeen and was subsequently destroyed.30 It will likely 
not be the last to be found on U.K. shores.
The United Kingdom’s experience with clearing minefields 
is still applicable to current ongoing efforts to clear minefields 
and battlefields. Firstly, it is noteworthy that the United 
Kingdom quickly accepted that clearance resources were in-
sufficient to guarantee zero risk from explosive hazards. An 
all reasonable effort approach to target resources effectively 
was adopted. Those who have promoted land release since 
2005 would recognize this approach. The most difficult mine-
fields were left to the end and cleared over a prolonged period, 
allowing quicker clearance of more straightforward areas. In 
general, it appears that prioritization of clearance was appro-
priate and successful. The United Kingdom also led the devel-
opment of mine clearance technology, including 4A mine 
detectors, Electrical Research Locators, and techniques such 
as the use of water jets. Moreover, along with many other 
countries in Europe, the United Kingdom developed realistic 
Figure 12. A 1941 image representing defenses at Dungeness, Kent, from the War Diary 8th Royal Fusiliers.24
Figure courtesy of The National Archives.
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Figure 13. Aerial image of Dungeness, Kent, as it appears today.
Photo courtesy of Google Earth.
capabilities to deal with the inevitable residual contamina-
tion. It is not known whether any national clearance program 
has managed to clear all contamination. Residual contamina-
tion can typically be minimized but not eliminated complete-
ly. The solution is to develop reasonable risk management and 
legal frameworks backed by a sustainable professional clear-
ance capacity. This model is seen in a number of countries in-
cluding many in Europe as well as Japan. The challenge for 
countries with more recent contamination is to develop a suit-
able and viable national capacity that can effectively manage 
the ongoing risks of residual explosive hazards. 
See endnotes page 65
The author would like to thank Wendi Pedersen for helping 
to prepare figures 5 and 6 of this article.
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ranges experienced in these last two studies were quite different, 
being relatively hot and dry in Long et al. study, while relatively 
cool and moist in Sargisson et al’s study, possibly explaining some 
of the differences.13,14
Limited research is available regarding the effect of weath-
er variables on the success of landmine- or explosives-detection 
dogs, who typically work outdoors and often under extreme envi-
ronmental conditions. Sargisson et al. explored the effect of tem-
perature, humidity, and rainfall on landmine detection by dogs 
in Afghanistan during trials spanning a full operational season 
for the dogs.8 All data were gathered during normal operational 
conditions. No effect was found for temperature on detection suc-
cess (i.e., hit rate), and some evidence was found for a negative re-
lationship between humidity and hit rate. As humidity declined 
under the dry conditions experienced in Afghanistan, hit rates in-
creased, and a strong effect was found for rainfall. Afghanistan 
had experienced four years of drought prior to the study, and most 
of the dogs were not likely to have experienced rain or have ever 
worked over moist ground. Significant rain fell early in the study, 
hampering detection success by increasing the number of false 
alarms and reducing the hit rate due to runoff spreading mine 
odor across the minefield.
The scant research on how weather parameters impact the odor-
detection success of dogs shows mixed results, possibly because 
success is linked to normal operational and training experienc-
es. If the weather moves outside those parameters as it did during 
the Afghanistan study, the dogs may struggle.8 For rats, we have 
found no published research investigating the effects of weather 
variables on odor-detection, probably because most work with 
rats is undertaken in laboratory conditions. We know of only one 
program in which rats serve as field-based odor-detectors: the use 
of giant African pouched rats (Cricetomys gambianus) by Anti-
Persoonsmijnen Ontmijnende Product Ontwikkeling (APOPO).15 
These rats are trained for landmine detection in Morogoro, 
Tanzania, which lies at 6 degrees 49 min south latitude and 37 
degrees 40 min east longitude, and is situated at elevation 504 m 
above sea level. They are currently working operationally on the 
Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, and in Angola and Cambodia, 
all areas with warm, temperate to tropical climates.16,17 Thus, the 
EFFECTS OF WEATHER ON DETECTION OF 
LANDMINES BY GIANT AFRICAN POUCHED RATS 
by Ian G. McLean, Ph.D. and Rebecca J. Sargisson, Ph.D.
A lthough APOPO has trained mine detection rats for many years, no published data exist on how weather pa-rameters relate to detection accuracy. Using data taken 
during routine training, we show that there was little relationship 
between the detection success of rats and rainfall but find that 
rates decreased, on average, with increasing temperatures and in-
creased with higher humidities. Individual rats vary in terms of 
sensitivity to temperature in that 
1. a small number of rats appear to work better at higher tem-
peratures, and 
2. most rats showed relatively low sensitivity to temperature at 
normal training temperatures. However, 
3. there was a proportion of rats for which temperature sen-
sitivity may be affecting detection reliability, and identify-
ing these rats relatively early in training should aid decision 
making about operational deployment.
Dogs and other animals function as odor-detection tools for 
an increasing array of detection applications outside the labora-
tory. Examples include the scat of endangered species, humans in 
collapsed buildings, cadavers, accelerants at fire scenes, contami-
nated land, weeds, landmines, and there are many more.1–8 It is 
broadly assumed that biological odor detectors working outdoors 
will be affected by environmental variables such as temperature, 
humidity, and wind.7–10 However, as also noted by Reed et al., we 
found surprisingly little empirical exploration of odor-detection 
success for animal detectors in relation to varying environmen-
tal conditions.11
Little or no effect of local weather conditions was found for dogs 
locating scats of mustelids or bears in a temperate forest environ-
ment in the Eastern United States.12 However, detection success 
improved with increasing number of days since precipitation, 
and increasing relative humidity for dogs searching for carnivore 
scat.11 For dogs searching for tortoises in a desert environment, 
significant effects on detection success were found for tempera-
ture (higher temperatures = better success), humidity (lower rela-
tive humidity = better success), and wind speed (increasing wind 
speed = better success).13 In a study in a cool temperate forest envi-
ronment, detection success improved with increasing tempera-
tures, but humidity had no effect.14 The temperature and humidity 
The Research and Development section is funded by the 
U.S. Department of Defense, 
Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE)
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rats are operational in weather conditions that are similar to, but 
somewhat more variable than, the conditions under which they 
were trained. 
In this study, we undertook a retrospective analysis of data col-
lected by APOPO in its training minefields to explore the effects 
of temperature, humidity, and rainfall on detection success of gi-
ant African pouched rats searching for landmines in Morogoro, 
Tanzania.
METHODS
APOPO supplied a file of information on the performance of 
rats during training and testing up until August 2016 in a mine-
field containing about 800 boxes. A box is a marked area of land 
between 60 and 400 sq m, contains zero to seven buried mines, 
and is surrounded by safe lanes. The search of one box represents 
one row of data. The file contained the details of each box: date, 
search time, rat identification, number of mines present (0–7), 
number of mines found, number of false alarms, and various ad-
ministrative details. We calculated the proportion of mines found 
(p = number mines found / number present, range 0–1), average 
search time of the box (time of start and end were both listed), and 
logit p as per Equation 1.
      
Logit p = log10
p+0.01
(1-p)+0.01
((
No weather variables were recorded by APOPO, and we obtained 
these separately as described below.
We rejected boxes for which there were obvious data-entry 
errors (such as time inconsistencies, missing data, or where p > 1), 
all boxes searched outside the standard training period of 06:30 
to 09:30, very short or very long searches (< 10 min, > 45 min), 
and all searches where boxes contained no mines. The edited data 
set consisted of 6,798 boxes for 217 rats and was fur-
ther reduced to 4,723 boxes after rejection of any box 
described as a blind test (there were relatively few of 
these per rat), any rat that searched fewer than 10 boxes 
all together, and all data before 2015. Larger sample sizes 
per rat were available in 2015 and 2016 than were avail-
able for earlier years. For a small number of boxes, some 
data were removed as there were a few days for which we 
could not obtain reliable weather data. 
The final data set contained information on searches 
of more than 10 boxes during training for each of the 86 
different rats for the period 5 January 2015 to 10 August 
2016; the average number of boxes per rat was 35.6, with 
a 95% confidence interval (CI) [30.82, 40.38]. Some rats 
were still in training, while others had completed train-
ing and were either deployed operationally or otherwise 
lost from the program. Following the criteria above, we 
included all rats for which data were available; we did not reject 
rats that died or failed accreditation.
TRAINING PROGRAM
When searching at the outdoor training field, a rat works on a 
line between two handlers who operate a running lead to keep the 
rat moving in the correct direction (Figure 1). The average time 
for a rat to complete a standard 100 sq m box is 19 min, 44 sec 
(n = 4,779) for training. If a supervisor is present, he or she will 
record indications as reported by the handlers. If no supervisor is 
present, no data are recorded. The availability of a supervisor to 
record data appeared to be entirely independent of the factors we 
were studying, and we do not regard the missing data as relevant 
to this study.
Rats receive initial training at the APOPO laboratory. Once they 
are deployed to the field, they go through three training stages: 
1. 3 m boxes are 60 sq m, contain a high density of mines 
(4–7), and have a 3 m axis on one side; 
2. 5 m boxes are of varying sizes up to 100 sq m, contain a 
medium density of mines (3–7), and have a 5 m axis on 
one side; and
3. advanced boxes are also of various sizes with dimensions 
up to 400 sq m, these contain a low density of mines (1–4). 
Boxes containing no mines can be used at any stage of training. 
The number of boxes searched at each stage of training in the fi-
nal data set was quite variable across rats, often including no box-
es for one stage, and we ignored stage of training in this analysis. 
Searches involving boxes with zero mines were rejected, because 
we were analyzing for the effects of weather variables on propor-
tion of mines found.
In training, handlers know where all mines are in the box and 
reward most correct indications (i.e., found mines) by the rats. As 
Figure 1. Rats undergoing training in the APOPO landmine-training field in 
Morogoro, Tanzania. The handlers (in blue) have a line attached to one leg, span-
ning the width of the box. The rat is wearing a harness that is attached to the 
line, allowing it to move back and forth along the line. The supervisor is in white.
Photo courtesy of APOPO.
Eq.1
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was not available, we used half the rainfall as an 
estimate of what may have already fallen at the 
time of the search in the morning. Rats did not un-
dergo training if rain fell during the usual training 
period but were trained if overnight rain had been 
light or was threatening and had not yet fallen. 
In order to build the weather models, we record-
ed temperature and humidity every 15 min from 
05:45 to 09:30 on 17 (temperature only), 19, 20, 
and 21 August 2016. It rained early on 17 August 
2016, and was dry overnight with initial clear skies 
(at 07:00), while the other three days experienced 
increased cloud cover. We used the patterns re-
corded on those days to predict the pattern of tem-
perature and humidity change on all other days of 
the year for which training data were available, us-
ing the available weather records at 06:00 and 09:00 
on each day to anchor the models and adjust them for seasonal-
ity. The model then predicted the temperature and humidity at the 
precise (average) time that the rat was searching a box on that day. 
As most boxes were searched in less than 30 min, the average time 
of the search approximates to the timing of an indication within 
15 min or less. 
The general pattern for temperature recorded in August 
(Figure 2) was a decline from 06:00 to a low point (between 06:30 
and 07:15), followed by a steady increase to 09:15. For humidity, 
the pattern was an increase to a peak (between 07:00 and 07:45) 
followed by a steady decline to 09:15 (Figure 3, page 46). There 
was some variation in scale and timing of the low or high point on 
the days that the detailed patterns were recorded, which we mini-
mized by using values averaged across the three to four days of de-
tailed data (solid line in Figures 2 and 3). The sun hit the ground 
at 07:20–07:25, which is consistent with the switch to increasing 
temperature and declining humidity in the data.
Due to the low latitude and the variability in this small data set, 
we did not attempt to adjust the models for the time of sunrise 
at other times of the year. Rather, we depended on the data from 
the weather station at 06:00 and 09:00 to anchor the models, and 
accepted that the estimates of temperature and humidity used in 
the analyses here are subject to error that is controlled for, but not 
eliminated, in the models.  
Being tropical, weather variation at Morogoro is influenced 
as much by rainfall and humidity as by temperature. There are 
two wet seasons: November and April (the April wet season is 
longer and with more rain), and winter temperatures are only 
a few degrees cooler than summer temperatures. Across a full 
year, the minimum and maximum temperatures measured at 
the Morogoro station were 14 and 28 C respectively for 06:00 and 
09:00, with a typical range of 3–4 C on any day. Thus, in August, 
handlers are not blind to the location of the mines, they can aid 
the rat in finding a mine by adjusting the criteria to accept a hit, or 
by gently manipulating the running line. However, there were still 
a large number of missed mines in the data set, and we hypothe-
sized that a proportion of those misses were linked to variation in 
weather variables. 
WEATHER DATA
Obtained from a government-run weather station 1 km from 
the training site, weather data were available for every day in the 
2015–2016 period; however, the reported details were inconsis-
tent. Temperature and relative humidity were usually reported 
at 06:00 and 09:00, and sometimes also reported for 07:00, 08:00, 
and 10:00. Rainfall was reliably reported as a total for the whole 
day, but information on specific times of rainfall was rarely re-
ported. Wind speed and direction were rarely reported and were 
ignored. Rats work close to the ground and were not worked in 
windy weather, thus they are unlikely to be affected by wind. Nor 
were they worked if the grass was wet or the ground boggy due to 
their tendency to stop constantly to groom. 
Needing more precise weather information than was available 
from the station, we built models using the available data in order 
to predict temperature and humidity at the precise times that rats 
searched the boxes. For rainfall, we estimated rain (in mm) in the 
24 hrs before each training day using Equation 2.
Equation 2 was adjusted if any information on when rainfall oc-
curred in the day was available, e.g., if all rain that fell on the day 
of the search fell after the time of the search, then none of that rain 
was included for the day of the search. When such information 
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Figure 2. Temperature change through the morning from 05:45 to 09:15 on four days 
in the third week of August, 2016. The average values used in modelling are shown as 
a solid line. The vertical line is the time when the sun hits the ground.
All figures courtesy of the authors.
Eq. 2    (mm of rain on day before the search) +
            (1/2 mm of rain on day of search)
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a typical temperature range was 17–20 C, and in January, it was 
22–25 C. We are confident that the models predicted temperatures 
with reasonable accuracy, especially after 07:00 when most of the 
boxes were searched.
Humidity was considerably more variable than temperature 
on a day-to-day basis (Figure 3). Model predictions were there-
fore likely to be of lower accuracy than for temperature. However, 
these predictions still give the best available estimate of humidity 
at the time of the search.
ANALYSES
We analyzed the data in two ways. First, we determined the 
effects of each of the three independent weather variables (tem-
perature, humidity, and rainfall) on the dependent variable (pro-
portion of mines found; here converted to logit p, see Equation 
1, page 44) using linear mixed modelling. Second, a descriptive 
analysis was essential to understand the patterns in the data, and 
we give examples of those analyses here to provide background for 
the study. All analyses used each rat as the subject that delivers the 
dependent variable. Thus, the reported sample size for any analy-
sis was the number of rats, with any variation in sample size of rats 
(n), caused by missing weather data resulting in the rat being ex-
cluded from a particular analysis. 
The number of search boxes available for each rat ranged from 
10 to 80. That large range created difficulties for statistical analyses 
exploring variation across rats in a repeated-measures design. We 
therefore collapsed the data for each rat in two ways. 
First, for each rat we collapsed p (Logit p) data into categories 
by calculating mean values for weather variable units: for tem-
perature, data were collapsed into 1 C units (range <15–27+ C, 
giving 14 categories); for humidity, data were collapsed into 2.5% 
units (range <67.5–100%, giving 14 categories); for rainfall, data 
were collapsed into unit ranges of increasing size with increasing 
rainfall (details in Results), giving 10 categories. The 
maximum n of 14 or 10 unit categories was usually less 
for each rat, as no data were available for some unit 
ranges for most rats, even if the original sample size 
was large (as described previously, the uncollapsed n 
was 10–80). Analyses were then performed on those 
partially collapsed measures. 
The proportion of mines found (p) is bound by the 
values 0 (none found) and 1 (all found), and is there-
fore not appropriate for parametric statistical analy-
ses, which require unbounded dependent variables. 
Therefore p was converted to logit p as per Equation 1. 
The conversion creates an unbounded value for p, 
where a p of 0.5 = 0, a p of 1 = 2 or more, and a p of 0 
= -2 or less. The adjustment of 0.01 avoids incalculable 
logit p values when p = 1 or 0. 
Second, for descriptive purposes, we calculated Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficients (r) across all boxes for each rat between each 
of the three weather variables (temperature, humidity, and rain-
fall) and proportion of mines found. Pearson’s r approximates the 
slope of the regression line for the rat in relation to the weath-
er variable, and serves as a proxy measure enabling comparison 
across rats using a single value. A large number of correlation co-
efficients were calculated, and our purpose was descriptive, thus 
we do not report significance. Pearson’s r ranges from -1 to +1. If 
r is positive, p increased as temperature, humidity, or rainfall in-
creased. If r is negative, p declined as those variables increased. 
If r is close to zero, p can be considered to be unaffected by the 
weather variable. As r becomes larger, i.e., approaches +1, detec-
tion success by the rat is increasingly likely to be influenced by the 
weather variable. However, interpretations based on the scale or 
significance of that influence should be cautious and supported by 
further analysis. 
RESULTS
Individual rats potentially contributed an accuracy score at 
each of 14 different temperature or humidity units and 10 differ-
ent rainfall units, introducing a repeated measure into the analy-
sis.18 Additionally, as not every rat contributed an accuracy score 
for every weather unit, there was incomplete data. Therefore, we 
ran three separate linear mixed models, one for temperature, one 
for humidity, and one for rainfall, using rat name as a random ef-
fect variable and the relevant weather variable as a fixed effect. For 
simplicity, all models were run using a homogeneous covariance 
structure with compound symmetry. 
The model for temperature was significant, F(1, 13) = 4.78, 
p < 0.001, showing a significant relationship between temperature 
and logit p. Figure 4 (page 47), which displays the estimated mar-
ginal means for logit p at each of the 14 temperature units, shows 
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Figure 3. Humidity change through the morning from 05:45 to 09:15 on three days 
in the third week of August, 2016. The average line used in modelling is shown as 
a solid line. The vertical line is when the sun hit the ground.
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that logit p decreased with increasing temperature. The model for 
humidity was also significant, F(1, 13) = 3.807, p < 0.001, show-
ing a significant relationship between humidity and detection 
success. Figure 4 shows that although detection success gener-
ally increased with increasing humidity, the pattern was slightly 
more variable than for temperature. The model for the relation-
ship between rainfall and detection success was not significant, 
F(1, 13) = 0.63, p = 0.76, and the estimated marginal means showed 
no consistent relationship with logit p, and therefore these means 
are not shown in Figure 4.
The correlation coefficients for each rat were linked to temper-
ature, humidity, and rainfall at the time of the search. Weather 
variables influence each other and are only partially independent. 
During the weather modelling, we noted that temperature and hu-
midity were inversely related, whereas any relationship of either of 
these variables with rainfall was not readily discernible (in part 
because there were many days with no rainfall). Our 
analyses consistently indicated that temperature 
was most strongly related to rat detection success, 
humidity was less strongly related, and there was no 
detectable relationship between detection and rain-
fall. We therefore emphasized temperature and in-
cluded the descriptive results for humidity, but not 
for rainfall. 
For temperature, the ratio of negative to positive r 
values was 61:25 (total n = 86) and the average r was 
-0.12, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.16] (Figure 5). Thus, for most 
rats, detection success declined with increasing tem-
perature, and there was a negative relationship with 
temperature for the average rat. The relationship be-
tween temperature and performance should be mi-
nor for rats with r values close to 0, and for 55 of 
the 86 rats (64%) r was within the range -0.2 to +0.2. 
Of the 31 rats with a stronger negative r than -0.2, 
seven had a very strong value (below -0.4) indicat-
ing a relatively high negative sensitivity to tempera-
ture. Four rats had a positive r over +0.2, suggesting 
that their detection success improved with increas-
ing temperature. Of these, one was only trained at 
lower temperatures (below 20 C) and the positive r 
should be discounted for this animal. However, two 
were trained within the typical range of tempera-
tures (17–25 C), and one was only trained at relative-
ly high temperatures (21–27 C). Thus, while the main 
effect of temperature on detection accuracy is nega-
tive, there appears to be a small proportion of rats 
for which performance improves at higher tempera-
tures.
For humidity, the ratio of negative to positive r 
values was 35:51 (total n = 86), and the average r was 0.07, 95% 
CI [0.02, 0.12]. Thus, the detection performance of rats tended to 
improve as humidity increased (Figures 4 and 5), with some rats 
showing a strong relationship between humidity and detection 
success (eight rats had an r > 0.4). 
There were four rats with strong sensitivity to both tempera-
ture (r < -0.4) and humidity (r > +0.4). Of these four, one showed a 
steady improvement on training trials with no evidence of strug-
gling in summer; one showed a steady overall training improve-
ment, but its performance declined in summer; one struggled in 
late summer, after which its performance improved as the weath-
er cooled, and one did not have enough data to interpret. We give 
these examples primarily to demonstrate how the sensitivity of in-
dividual rats can be explored if appropriate data are available.
For rainfall, the ratio of negative to positive r values was 41:44 
(total n = 85) and the average r was -0.01, 95% CI [-0.05, +0.05]. 
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The relationship between rainfall and detection overall was small, 
with only a few animals performing more or less accurately in wet 
conditions. However, the rainfall analysis was dominated by dry 
days, with about two-thirds of the searches undertaken after zero 
rainfall in the last one and a half days, and most others experienc-
ing relatively little rainfall. There were only a few days in the year 
when substantial rain fell, and the rats were not usually trained on 
those days (although they might be trained the next day when a 
heavy rainfall would be included in the data). Overall, the number 
of searches on which significant rain fell was only a small propor-
tion of the overall data set, and our ability to detect any relation-
ship between detection and rain was therefore limited.
DISCUSSION
Overall, these results give confidence in the ability of most rats 
to cope with weather variation under the conditions experienced 
at the training fields. However, the greatest relationship between 
detection success and weather was found for temperature, which 
is frequently an issue in the places where animals (including rats) 
are used to search for landmines. Temperatures at ground level 
in environments in which there is little vegetation can rise more 
quickly than air temperature measured by a weather station would 
suggest.8 APOPO is aware of this issue, and the trainers report-
ed to us that lethargy could appear quickly if rats were working 
over bare ground, even if air temperatures were within the normal 
working range. Ground vegetation buffers the heating effect of di-
rect sun, giving a longer operational time, and cloud cover is more 
likely when humidity is high. It appears that the most appropriate 
locations for these rats to work outdoors are those where humidity 
remains relatively high, and there is ground vegetation. We cannot 
comment from these data on whether there are minimum temper-
ature limits for operational use of rats.
A small proportion of rats showed a strong enough relationship 
with temperature and/or humidity and detection performance to 
suggest that APOPO could benefit from monitoring performance 
in relation to weather parameters. Perhaps most importantly, it 
should be possible to identify those individuals for whom perfor-
mance is strongly positively related to temperature and deploy 
them preferentially to operational theatres where temperature is 
likely to be an issue. Individuals whose performance is strongly 
negatively related to temperatures might be deployed to laboratory- 
based detection tasks, such as tuberculosis testing, where temper-
ature and humidity are controlled. 
A concern for APOPO is that apparently well-trained rats may 
still fail accreditation testing, which is a single event undertaken 
following the U.N.-approved mine action standards. Failure on 
that test could delay opportunities for operational deployment, 
and has resulted in individual rats being held back in their train-
ing programs. While the standards must be adhered to, the results 
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from this study suggest that temperature may be a factor in some 
of those failures, and consideration of the relationship between 
performance of individual rats in relation to weather parameters 
for both testing and the proposed deployment theatre might be 
appropriate. 
See endnotes page 65
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Developing a Hyperspectral Non-Technical Survey for 
Minefields via UAV and Helicopter
By Milan Bajić, Ph.D., Tamara Ivelja, and Anna Brook, Ph.D.
The main topic discussed in this paper is the research, development, and implementation of hyperspec-tral remote sensing technology in humanitarian mine 
action (HMA), mainly for non-technical survey (NTS) from 
aerial platforms (Figure 1).1 NTS should be conducted to deter-
mine whether landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) exist 
in considered areas and whether clearance is needed and if so, in 
what scope. The availability of the hyperspectral sensors (2011–
2012) that are suitable for use with multi-engine unmanned aer-
ial vehicles (UAV) enabled the development of systems for HMA. 
While large and costly airborne hyperspectral systems have been 
available for over two decades, they had little to no impact on 
HMA.2 Optical spectroscopy brought out interest in the relation-
ship between vegetation and explosives, and this relationship 
is considered herein. Therefore, we briefly analyzed the state of 
landmine detection via hyperspectral technology, particularly 
the efforts to detect the mines due to the influence of explosives 
on vegetation reflectance spectra. 
The Croatian Mine Action Centre for testing, development and 
training Ltd. (HCR-CTRO) contributed to the development and 
implementation of hyperspectral technology in mine action and 
is also discussed here. Our activity in the domain of HMA started 
with the European Commission FP5-IST project ARC and contin-
ued to the European Commission’s Framework Programme 7 (FP7) 
project: TIRAMISU.3,4 In this program, the Specim ImSpector 
V9 hyperspectral line scanner was integrated as a push broom 
mode acquisition system for surveying minefields and UXO-
contaminated areas, as well as for other purposes.5–12 In 2015, a full 
frame hyperspectral sensor, the Cubert UHD-185, was applied.4,13 
Both types of sensors (line scanner and full frame sensor) were 
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Figure 1. The considered topics. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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The basic operational features of the considered hyperspectral 
sensors are explained in Figure 2. Line scanners (2a) collect hyper-
spectral data for W wavelengths in successive lines. Technically 
complex, line scanners produce results that are available after 
time-consuming processing. Near real-time, full-frame sensors 
(2b) include images in visible wavelengths (blue), sharpening the 
spatially coarser hyperspectral image (red) at W wavelengths of 
the same area. The intrinsic hyperspectral spatial resolution is Q 
times coarser (e.g., Q = 20). Near real-time control of collected 
hyperspectral data is possible. Near real-time sensors (2c) pro-
vide hyperspectral data at any K of W selected wavelengths, K < W 
(typical K = 30, W = 300) at full spatial resolution.
Besides the development of a hyperspectral survey system suit-
able for NTS, our goal was to implement the methods and tech-
nology for NTS in minefields by applying spectroscopy. The initial 
goal was to analyze and verify the vegetation indices that show 
differences between the mixture of grassy vegetation inside (IN) 
and outside (OUT) of the minefield. For this purpose, minefields 
in Croatia, near Benkovac (Figure 3) and Murgići, near Lički Osik 
(Figure 4, page 53) were surveyed.
Figure 2a.
Figure 2b.
Figure 2c.
Figure 2(a-c). Modes of hyperspectral data collecting at W wave-
lengths, typical W > 90. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
IN - Mineeld Benkovac - 10,000 sq m
Blind test area - 5,900 sq m
Public data area = 1,600 sq m
OUT = 43,323 sq m
ROI = IN+OUT = 53,323 sq m
Blind test
Public
IN
OUT
integrated into aerial acquisition and navigation systems on board 
a UAV and a Bell-206 helicopter, as well as on ground vehicle plat-
forms in technically simpler versions. These were involved in the 
intensive data collecting campaigns over the minefields.
Figure 3a. The hyperspectral detection of the difference between 
grassy vegetation IN and OUT of the minefield. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
Figure 3b. Bushes and trees are excluded from hyperspectral data.
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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Hyperspectral data (Figure 3a) were collected simultaneously 
on the OUT (43,323 sq m) and IN (10,000 sq m) areas of the 
Benkovac minefield (containing 1,000 mines), where 5,900 sq m 
of the minefield is aimed for the blind statistical tests. Public-use 
data on the location of 150 mines exists for part of the minefield. 
Bushes and trees hyperspectral data were excluded manually from 
data of the IN and OUT areas.
In our approach, the features and characteristics of the partic-
ular vegetation types were not analyzed. Instead, a grassy vegeta-
tion mixture (IN and OUT) of the considered area was taken into 
account. This is a crucial fact on which we continued our research 
and development. Differences in the vegetation’s spectral reflec-
tance (both IN and OUT) were perceived and confirmed in a case 
of the Benkovac minefield. After this step, vegetation indices were 
analyzed, and we confirmed that indices values from the IN area 
differ from those of the OUT areas.4,10,13
Besides the references linked to our work, a large amount of 
valuable information on hyperspectral topics exists. Used for mil-
itary applications, this technology can analyze the variability of 
terrain signatures, produce hyperspectral images for data fusion, 
and detect anomalies.14–18 
HYPERSPECTRAL DETECTION
Some of the earliest information on hyperspectral detection 
of buried mines via the spectral changes in vegetation was pre-
sented in 1997 (McFee, Ripley), 2007 (McFee et al.) and later in 
2010 (Yoresh).19,20,21 In 2007, McFee et al. reported that “The detec-
tion of buried mines using a CASI hyperspectral imager from per-
sonnel lift at 5 m distance, under various vegetative covers and 
bare soil at various times from 1 2/3 to 15 1/2 months after burial. 
Short vegetation gave better detection results than bare soil which 
gave better results than medium length vegetation. Probability of 
detection (Pd) was typically in the range of 55 to 94 percent and 
False Alarm Rate (FAR) varied from about 0.17/m2 to 0.52/m2.”20 
In 2010, Yoresh stated that “Processing of the imagery was applied 
into a mosaic of the geometrically rectified 125 channels HyMap, 
data which was atmospherically corrected. It allows identifying 
suspected minefields, in the size of 30 x 30 meters from satellite 
photo, and of smaller size of 1 x 1 meter from aerial photos.”21
The longwave infrared (LWIR) hyperspectral method of detect-
ing buried mines is based on sensing soil surface changes.22 The 
extremely high cost of LWIR hyperspectral sensors limits their 
application when compared to the prices of visible, near-infrared, 
and shortwave wavelength sensors.
The hyperspectral method of detecting mines on the sur-
face in visible, near-infrared light and shortwave infrared light 
is described by McFee et al. as “Individual mines [that] could 
be distinguished from backgrounds in all seasons and times of 
day between sunrise and sunset, even when they were partially 
obscured by vegetation. High spatial resolution airborne imagery 
of real and surrogate minefields has also been obtained from the 
helicopter (0.1 m x 0.1 m at 75 m altitude to 0.2 m x 0.2 m at 150 m 
altitudes). Analysis yielded Pd of nearly 100 % with FAR of 0.0003 
per sq m and 0.004 per sq m. Real-time analysis, necessary for mil-
itary applications, has been demonstrated from low speed ground 
vehicles and recently from airborne platforms. Down-welling 
radiation sensors are necessary to allow detection of mines inde-
pendent of natural illumination, since calibrated panels are not 
practical in the field.”20 
The process of using hyperspectral imagery to detect unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO) that has been scattered by unplanned 
explosions of munition stockpiles is discussed in (Foley, 
Patterson 2007), (Bajić et al. 2013), (Yvinec et al. 2015). The wide 
area assessment of UXO distribution at and around ammuni-
tion depots post explosion can be obtained by combining aer-
ial hyperspectral and very high spatial resolution visible (VHR 
VIS) images. A similar approach was applied where hyper-
spectral samples were collected by ground based system and 
VHR VIS sensors attached to helicopters and UAVs.8,24  For 
TIRAMISU 2012, we collected hyperspectral and VHR VIS data 
and images of UXO, soil, and vegetation relevant to unplanned 
explosions of munition stockpiles.4 
Assessing former military test sites with hyperspectral imag-
ing to detect the UXO and abandoned ordnance (AXO) on or 
below the surface was considered in 2007 (Foley, Patterson).8,23,24 
Researchers concluded that the wide area assessment of UXO 
distribution in the former military test range could be obtained 
by combined aerial hyperspectral and VHR VIS images.23 The 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) observed a similar approach that was applied to a for-
mer military shooting range and concluded that the statements 
about probability and reliability of results are not strong enough 
and are not supported by evidence.25
Using hyperspectral imaging to detect residual contamination 
on military test sites that will be used for civilians once clearance 
has been completed is a standard problem.26 For former military 
test sites (i.e., shooting ranges), clearance requires convincing evi-
dence and verification that levels of residual contamination are at 
acceptable thresholds. The hyperspectral aerial survey and ground 
truth hyperspectral measurements provide a basis for success. 
The hyperspectral survey of minefields was reported in 2010 
(Yoresh), whereas the observer considers substantial limita-
tion of the method due to vegetation’s role in the method.21,25,27
Partial analyses of  spectral features of plants fed by explo-
sives appear quite often. A very simple goal was defined: “To 
determine if a technique called hyperspectral imaging can be 
used as an accurate tool for detecting buried explosives.”28 In 
2014 (Smit et al), the analysis was serious: “Indigenous trees in 
51
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 21.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 52
20 liter pots contaminated with different TNT concentrations, 
plants were kept in semi-natural conditions, concentrations used 
were from 30 mg/kg, to 5000 mg/kg.29 Initial results show that 
there are impacts. Some trees showed more impact than others. 
The plants healthier than their neighbors could indicate the pres-
ence of a minefield : toxins from explosives leak into the surround-
ing environment, affecting plant health, especially herbaceous 
plants more than woody plants.30,31 They are considering creat-
ing an ‘Explosive Specific Index’ that will record how explosives 
affect various vegetation types.” In 2016, Manley reported: “Three 
species representing different functional types (Cyperus esculen-
tus, a sedge; Ulmus alata, a tree; Vitis labrusca, a vine) exposed to 
RDX and TNT over a nine-week period.32 Woody species, exhib-
ited changes in pigment content, leaf area, specific leaf area, dry 
leaf biomass, and canopy reflectance.” 
The hyperspectral detection of illicit plants is a technology 
suitable for counter-drug survey in case of combined drug plants 
fields with mines and the improvised explosive devices (IED) in 
certain countries e.g., coca fields in Colombia.33,34 The availability 
of a new generation of hyperspectral sensors (full frame cameras), 
which provide data in near real time, is key to the implementation 
of this technology. 
In the last several years, UAVs were frequently considered for 
detection purposes, although the first fully operational project 
based on UAV platforms for mine action was done in 2014.35 In 
future projects, the use of the full frame hyperspectral cameras 
will significantly advance results of the survey.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Experience from several airborne-based NTS projects enabled 
a unique and holistic approach to the problem of large suspected 
hazardous areas (SHA), the minefields survey and the challenges 
and chances for hyperspectral technology.35,36 SHA is an area where 
there is reasonable suspicion of mine and explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the 
presence of mines and ERW.
OBJECTIVES AND GOALS
Our current work in a hyperspectral domain was led by the fol-
lowing goals:
• Goal 1: Develop, test, evaluate, and operationally validate a 
system suitable for hyperspectral NTS based on the applica-
tion of a multi-engine UAV and currently available hyper-
spectral sensors.
• Goal 2: Collect and prove that the pure spectral sam-
ples (endmembers) data for considered UXO enable their 
detection.
• Goal 3: Prove that the spectral vegetation indices enable dis-
criminating grassy vegetation IN and OUT of the minefield.
OBJECTIVES:
• To develop, test, evaluate, and validate the system for hyper-
spectral data collection via UAV and helicopter that are suit-
able for applications in NTS.
• To assess SHAs and minefields, not the positions of mines, 
and consider the minefields with sub-surface mines. 
• To develop a hyperspectral data library of unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) collected after the unplanned explosion of the 
ammunition depot. To derive functions that link probabili-
ties of detection, classification, recognition, and identifica-
tion with spatial resolution of very high resolution images in 
the visible wavelengths.
• To consider only the grassy vegetation as the potential car-
riers of information of buried mines. Avoid the analysis of 
particular vegetation types and take into account a mixture 
of grassy vegetation (IN and OUT) of the considered area 
instead. Differences in spectrum and vegetation indices val-
ues were expected and should be confirmed.
The considered SHA and minefield (IN) surrounding the vege-
tated area (OUT) were available with the same features (soil, mois-
ture, vegetation). This area was not cultivated from the time the 
mines were buried until survey. The hyperspectral data acquisition 
of the SHA, minefield and surrounding area were conducted simul-
taneously in the same acquisition flight. 
Since 2002, we have used the hyperspectral system for analyses 
in the ecology and forestry sectors.5,11,12 The initial key influence on 
our goals was made in 2011 by Šestak, who supported the concept 
that the mixture of grassy vegetation should be the representative 
of the situation in the considered minefields and SHA instead of 
one preselected vegetation type.37
MINEFIELDS
Within the scope of the TIRAMISU project, two approaches 
were defined regarding the hyperspectral detection of minefields 
and SHA. The aim of the first approach was to develop, test, eval-
uate, and validate a system for hyperspectral data collection via 
UAV and helicopter that is suitable for application in NTS, to col-
lect pure spectral samples (endmembers), to derive hyperspectral 
cubes for considered set of UXO, and to prove that the vegeta-
tion indices can discriminate between the grass IN and OUT of 
the minefield. The work on the first approach was continued, and 
hyperspectral survey flights have been made by UAVs and helicop-
ters on SHAs and minefields for a total area of 514,000 sq m. Survey 
was done from lower altitudes, and valuable data with high spatial 
resolution were gained, Figure 3 (page 50) and Figure 4. The sec-
ond approach was large-scale, aerial, hyperspectral acquisition of 
SHAs and minefields in different terrain, climate, vegetation, and 
mine contamination. It was planned to survey around 136 sq km of 
SHAs and minefields with a HySpex sensor (visible, near infrared, 
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shortwave infrared). Also, the ground truth mission for that area 
was planned and prepared. The main expected benefit should 
have been a significant set of hyperspectral data representing the 
above-mentioned areas of interest. Based on these data, it would 
be possible to differentiate land cover classes and derive reliable 
statistics of vegetation characteristics and features difference from 
IN and OUT of the contaminated areas. Unfortunately, these sur-
veys were never conducted. 
Figure 4a depicts the SHA and Murgići minefield near Lički 
Osik in Croatia. The image of Murgići is visualized by nar-
row wavelengths (8 nm) spectral images (central wavelengths: 
red = 650 nm, green = 550 nm, blue = 458 nm). Areas in the blue 
delineated polygons have been demined. This area, with a mine-
field near Benkovac, served as the research, development, testing, 
evaluation, and validation area. Figure 4b shows a small example 
area selected from the demined area that demonstrates the hyper-
spectral survey potentials for NTS. This area is hilly and has a con-
tinental climate.
Figure 3a (page 50) depicts the Benkovac minefield. The red 
polygon outlines mined area 50 x 200 m. The black line is the bor-
der of the region of interest (ROI). The hyperspectral data and 
very high resolution color images were collected via helicopter 
and UAV. This area has a rocky terrain and a subcoastal climate. 
It contains 1,000 mines with very high density of 0.1 mine per sq 
m, and for that reason, served as the main area for our research. 
In the Benkovac minefield, hyperspectral acquisition was con-
ducted via light helicopter, UAV, and ground vehicles in 2012, 
2013, and 2015.
The Prototyping Model was applied in research and develop-
ment of the hyperspectral acquisition system. The Prototyping 
Model is a systems development method in which an early 
approximation of a final system is built, tested, and then 
reworked as necessary until an acceptable prototype is finally 
achieved. This model works best in scenarios where not all of 
the project requirements are known in detail ahead of time. It 
is an iterative, trial-and-error process that takes place between 
the developers and the users. The main difficulty is the need 
to understand the collected hyperspectral data from the mine-
fields, and the ability to correct and calibrate the data, analyze 
the results, and decide on the next step in the system develop-
ment.10 This process is ref lected later in the article.
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
Addressing the on-surface issue was done by examining the 
exploded ammunition depot of Pađene (near the town of Knin, 
Croatia), in which an explosion occurred in 2011 and large 
amounts of UXO were scattered in an approximately 5 km radius 
area. The area was under ground-based and airborne survey, dur-
ing which hyperspectral UXO data was collected.8,24 The main 
goal was to provide a reliable ground truth for discriminating 
UXO from its surrounding (soil, vegetation, etc.). 
SENSORS, PLATFORMS, AND HYPERSPECTRAL DATA ACQUISITION
A helicopter-mounted, multi-sensor, aerial acquisition system 
with a hyperspectral line scanner was initially developed in the 
ARC project and later upgraded.3–8 It was the first non-military 
system for airborne NTS. Several kinds of aerial platforms have 
been used in research and development of hyperspectral technol-
ogy for minefield surveys. To achieve quality data, the following 
requirements for the platform have been defined:
• It needs to be able to operate at a low speed.
• It needs to be able to operate at low heights.
• Platform swinging and vibrations must be minimal.
These requirements are largely related to survey with the V9 
hyperspectral line scanner, Figure 2a (page 50), and the com-
plex procedure of pre-processing hyperspectral images by para-
metric geocoding.6,7,10 Several data acquisition systems were 
developed for multiple platforms: light and heavy helicopters 
(Bell-206b, Gazela, Mi-8), a radio controlled blimp and differ-
ent types of UAVs, Figure 6 (page 54). The acquisition systems 
Figure 4b. The small subarea selected from demined one (blue delineated 
polygon).
Figure courtesy of the authors.
Figure 4a. The gray area of the Murgići minefield (> 504,000 sq m) near Lički 
Osik, Croatia, for which hyperspectral data were collected via helicopter.
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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Figure 6e (left). Bell-206 with V9 line scanner and UHD-185 frame sensor. 
Figure 6f (right). Sensor pod on Bell-206.
are always assembled from several components: acquisition com-
puter, communication unit, GPS receiver, and electric power sup-
ply. Moreover, the V9 hyperspectral line scanner requires inertial 
measuring unit (IMU) on board the aerial platform for measure-
ment of its pitch, roll, and yaw. That much equipment encum-
bers the aerial platform significantly. For helicopters, the payload 
parameter was not a problem, while for the blimp (Figure 6b) 
and multi-engine UAVs (Figure 6c and Figure 6d), this is the 
most critical issue limiting flight performances and endurance. 
In 2015, we introduced a new hyperspectral sensor, a full-frame 
hyperspectral camera UHD-185 (generation 2012),  with which 
we substituted the V9 line scanner used before (generation 2000). 
Application of the new camera enabled us to finalize successful 
development of the system and technology for aerial NTS sur-
vey via UAV and helicopter: Figure 6c-f. Technical stability and 
robustness of the system was confirmed during intensive data 
collection missions in Croatia, 2015. Developed acquisition sys-
tems on a light helicopter Bell-206B and multi-engine UAVs were 
approved and validated by the Croatian Mine Action Centre 
(CROMAC).4 
The research of the basic behavior of hyperspectral features, 
potentially relevant for the goals and the objectives defined pre-
viously, was conducted on the Benkovac minefield, Figure 3a 
Cluster bomblets PTAB
2.5M - 1 12MK
Mortar round 60 P1 Artillery shells 130TF
for M46
Round 100mm M69 P1
Mortar rounds 120mm
TTF and 82 mm
Air to air missile 9M
114K-STURMt
Air bomb SAB 100 MP Cluster bomb BL-755,
container for bomblets
Air bomb BETAB 500 Warhead of air missile
S-24B
Air cluster bomb
RBK-250
Training missile
VRS 57MM P1
Figure 5. The spectral features were measured for a number of UXO items. 
Figure 6a. Mi-8. Figure 6b. Radio-controlled blimp.
Figure 6c (left). Eight-engine unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). 
Figure 6d (right). Four-engine UAV with UHD-185 sensor.
Figure 6(a-f). Aerial platforms used in the research and develop-
ment of the hyperspectral non-technical survey.
Figures courtesy of the authors.
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(page 50), using ground-based vehicle systems, Figure 7.9 Through 
the ground-based systems’ nadir mode, hyperspectral data and 
respective color video data were collected during 2012, Figure 16 
(page 60). The ground-based hyperspectral survey systems show 
high sensitivity and very high spatial resolution of hyperspec-
tral data of the minefield in flat terrain, but more processing is 
needed to overcome imaging geometry problems due to a rough 
terrain and to properly link the positions of buried mines with 
the hyperspectral data. A developed technique and technology of 
hyperspectral imaging from a UAV was operationally validated as 
a useful one, and it can completely substitute the ground-based 
hyperspectral survey.4 
GEOMETRY OF ACQUISITION 
Data collected by the V9 line scanner are spatially scattered due 
to pitch and roll of the aerial platform, see Figure 8a. After para-
metric geocoding, the lines are transformed to form a row of par-
allel lines, Figure 2a (page 50), and the result is the corresponding 
hyperspectral cube, Figure 8b. Data collected by hyperspectral 
frame sensor (model in Figure 2b) produce the hyperspectral 
cubes, their borders on images are white overlapping rectangles, 
Figure 8c.
The hyperspectral frame cameras that work in mode Figure 2c 
(page 50) have smaller number of wavelengths (channels), K < W, 
but their hyperspectral images enable mosaicking due to their full 
spatial resolution in comparison to cameras, which work in accor-
dance to the model in Figure 2b (page 50).
CALIBRATION
Changes in the Sun’s irradiance, see Figure 9, have strong neg-
ative impacts on the quality of the collected hyperspectral data 
and consequently on the airborne hyperspectral NTS operations. 
L
zSensor V9
looking 
direction
Sliding carriage 
on the rail
y
H
0
ß
y
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α0
α2
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b
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D
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Xmax
Figure 7a. Figure 7b. 
Figure 7c. 
Figure 7. Ground-based vehicle platforms for collecting hyperspec-
tral data: a) for collecting nadir data, b) for collecting oblique data, 
and c) geometry for collecting oblique data.9 
Figures courtesy of authors.
 Figure 8b.  Figure 8a.
Figure 8c. 
Figure 8 (a-c). Geometry of collecting airborne hyperspectral data 
a) with a line scanner, narrow rectangular areas (named - lines) are 
scattered due to pitch, roll, and yaw of the aerial platform. b) The 
parametric geocoding is needed to provide a hyperspectral images. 
c) The frame hyperspectral cameras produce a hyperspectral set of 
images for each frame (note white borders of the frames). 
Figures courtesy of authors.
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The down-welling radiation sensors are necessary if the cali-
brated panels are not practical in the field.20 The radiation sen-
sor FODIS of the V9 line scanner can be the source of errors, 
whereas the frame sensor UHD-185 counts on a calibrated panel 
Spectralon for near range missions if done via UAV, Figure 10. If 
the frame sensor is used from the helicopter, larger calibrating 
objects should be used, while the measurements have to be done 
at the take-off and landing flight phases. The supervised vicarious 
calibration (Brook, Ben Dor 2011) is operationally the most suit-
able one.38 The insolation variability limits hyperspectral survey 
by UAV at shorter time spans and at smaller ranges. Alternatively, 
helicopters are necessary platforms, as the speed is greater than 
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Figure 9 (a-b). Sun irradiance changes in the day. a) The absolute irradiance during working hours a) at 10:00 and b) at 19:32 local time. 
Figures courtesy of authors.
Figure 9a. Figure 9b. 
the speed of the UAVs. Figure 9 shows an example of the changes 
of the absolute irradiance during working hours. 
NEAR REAL TIME CONTROL OF COLLECTED HYPERSPECTRAL DATA 
The near real-time frame hyperspectral sensors (frame sensor), 
which operate in accordance to Figure 2b (page 50), enable con-
trol of the data collecting from the helicopter, see Figure 11. This 
is the most important operational advantage for hyperspectral 
NTS of SHAs, as minefields in some  areas are out of range for 
UAV platforms. The technology that is currently available does 
not enable near real-time control of data while flying UAVs, but it 
is possible after landing.
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Figure 10. Radiometry calibration of the hyperspectral data collected from UAV. a) Reflectance spectra of Spectralon at nominal levels 12%, 
25%, 50% and 90% reflectance. b) Reflectance marker Spectralon.
Figures courtesy of authors.
Figure 10a. Figure 10b.
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DEMONSTRATING THE BENEFITS OF NTS AND  
UXO DETECTION BY SELECTED PROCESSING
The hyperspectral remote sensing, data processing, and  appli-
cation in many domains are very developed, and basic informa-
tion is available in many sources.14,15,17,18,37,39,40 While our goal is to 
enable aerial hyperspectral NTS of SHAs and minefields and the 
survey of UXO, we will select two simple examples that clearly 
demonstrate the convincing benefits that are operationally feasi-
ble. In these examples, we apply the following processing meth-
ods: (1) the Feature Mapping method, using the data of selected 
wavelengths and (2) the Spectral Angle Mapping (SAM) method of 
processing hyperspectral data.29,39 In these examples, we avoided 
thorough quantitative analyses (e.g., by confusion matrix), while 
the visual comparison of images verifies effects.
THE FEATURE MAPPING METHOD OF 
PROCESSING OF HYPERSPECTRAL DATA 
The Feature Mapping method enables the visual interpretation of 
a reference image to guide the automated classification procedures 
applied to any number of images at different wavelengths. Results 
are the set of spectral categories or feature classes. This method 
takes advantage of visual interpretation skills, and the classification 
can be simply programmed. Another advantage is the application 
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Figure 11a. Figure 11b. 
Figure 11c. 
Figure 11d. 
Figure 11. a) Sensor operator can check the reflectance spectra of 
objects and terrain below the helicopter. b) Example of objects be-
low the helicopter during the acquisition flight, c) reflectance spec-
tra of areas from d). Note that the same colors are used for selection 
of areas on c) and d) for presenting their reflectance.
Figures courtesy of authors.
of the subset of any K < W hyperspectral images, W is maximum 
number of images in used wavelength range from λmin to λmax. 
Therefore this method is suitable for hyperspectral sensors that 
operate in modes, Figure 2c (page 50), that provide full spatial 
resolution of hyperspectral data in K spectral wavelengths. The 
example in Figure 12 (page 58) demonstrates useful outcomes of 
Feature Mapping applied to eight wavelengths from 135 available 
wavelengths, Figure 12a, Figure 12d, Figure 12e, three wavelengths 
in Figure 12f, and only two wavelengths in Figure 12b and Figure 
12c. The eight wavelengths were selected after reflectance spectra 
analysis in the considered hyperspectral scene from Figure 4b (page 
53), the aim was to discriminate between the road, grassy meadow, 
and trees. The selected wavelengths were 450 nm, 502 nm, 550 nm, 
602 nm, 650 nm, 702 nm, 750 nm, and 802 nm.
THE BENEFITS FOR NTS 
1. The grassy vegetation in meadow Figure 12d are easily dis-
criminated from trees Figure 12e, while in the TIRAMISU 
2012 project, this was not solved. 
2. The road is partially covered by grass but can be detected 
from eight wavelengths, Figure 12a.
3. The normalized difference vegetation index NDVI detects 
the road, Figure 12b. Here is NDVI = (NIR-R)/(NIR+R), 
where NIR is the image at wavelengths 750 nm, 702 nm, or 
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802 nm, R is the image at wavelength 650 nm. Figure 12c 
shows negative of NDVI from Figure 12b.
4. If three images are selected that present red, green, and blue 
parts of visible spectra (650 nm, 550 nm, 450 nm), trees can-
not be reliably classified, Figure 12f, whereas eight wave-
lengths, Figure 12e, are successful.
Note that for the Feature Mapping method to be successful, a 
selection of wavelengths is needed. While in the worst case, one 
can select more of them and gain the experience after several 
trials at a current scene.
HYPERSPECTRAL DETECTION OF UXO BY SAM METHOD
SAM is a method that uses the angle between any two spectral 
vectors originating from a common origin, where the magnitude of 
the angle indicates the similarity or dissimilarity of the materials—
a smaller angle correlates with a more similar spectral signature.39 
The SAM method of processing was applied to a hyperspectral 
cube of UXO described on page 53 and can be seen in Figure 13. 
Hyperspectral cube is the name for a hyperspectral images format 
in which consecutive images follow each other in accordance to 
increasing wavelengths. The spectral samples are measured from 
the hyperspectral cube in Figure 13a and stored. Via the SAM 
method, the shape of the mortar mine M60 in real environment 
(grass, red soil, and rocks) can be reconstructed, Figure 13b.
The diagram in Figure 14a shows measured radiance spectra of 
mortar mine M60 and environment, while the Figure 14b shows a 
radiometry marker Spectralon. Note that for SAM, the radiance data 
have been calibrated and transformed into reflectance.
THE BENEFITS FOR UXO DETECTION 
• The provided spectral radiance data of UXO samples from 
Figure 5 (page 54), after transformation into reflectance, en-
ables assessment of spectral endmembers and detection of 
target by the SAM method.
Figure 12a. 
Figure 12c. 
Figure 12e. 
Figure 12b. 
Figure 12d. 
Figure 12f. 
Figure 12 (a-f). Application of the feature mapping and computer-assisted photo interpretation (CAPI) on the hyperspectral images at select-
ed wavelengths for discrimination of the field road and the meadow with grassy plants from trees. 
Figures courtesy of authors.
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• The initial spectral library of UXO samples, which were col-
lected after the unplanned explosion of the ammunition 
depot, seems to be the first one published so far. In any case, 
this practice should be continued.
• Based on the gained experience with UXO, similar although 
more ambitious practice should be applied for improvised 
explosive devices (IED).
IMPLEMENTING THE MODIFIED JOHNSON’S CRITERIA FOR  
UXO SURVEY
The probability of successfully conducting aerial survey 
functions—detection, classification, recognition, and identifi-
cation—of UXO can be estimated by comparing the spatial res-
olution of the electro-optical sensor (e.g., its ground resolving 
distance d) and the UXO dimensions. In the advanced Johnson’s 
model, the two orthogonal dimensions of UXO (e.g., its length 
Lx, and width Ly) are combined in their geometrical mean: 
Lc = (LxLy)1/2.40 Describing the situation by the available number 
of resolution elements, N = Lc/d, the probably of the successful 
survey (P) is determined by:
P = (N/N50)E/[1+(N/N50)E], E = 2.7+0.7(N/N50)
where the parameter N50 equals N needed for P = 0.5. Table 1 
(page 60) indicates the value for N50 for each of four survey 
functions.  
The above model relates the UXO dimensions, sensor resolu-
tion and probability of the success of the survey for a given item of 
UXO. Typical results are illustrated in Figure 15 (page 60), using 
the mortar mine M60 from Figure 5 (page 54).
Figure 13a. Hyperspectral image of a target (the mortar mine M60) 
visualized by narrow band (10 nm) images (central wavelengths red 
– 650 nm, green 550 nm, blue 450 nm).
Figures courtesy of authors.
Figure 13b. Spectral Angle Mapping (SAM) for angle 3, 7 degrees re-
constructs the shape of the target.
Figures courtesy of authors.
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Figure 14a. Radiance spectra of the target M60, soil, grass, and cali-
bration lines of 12%, 25%, 50%, and 90% radiance.
Figures courtesy of authors.
Figure 14b. Hyperspectral image of the Spectralon marker for radi-
ometry calibration. 
Figures courtesy of authors.
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DETECTING THE DIFFERENCES OF GRASSY VEGETATION IN AND 
OUT OF THE MINEFIELD
The first hyperspectral data of grass inside the Benkovac mine-
field were collected by the V9 line scanner with a ground based 
nadir looking system, Figure 7a (page 55), Figure 16. Around 
1,000 mines are buried in the Benkovac minefield. Locations for 
150 mines are available for the public part of Figure 3a (page 50), 
while the mines in the blind test area are aimed at blind statisti-
cal tests and their distribution is not available. The mines are ran-
domly distributed in 45 rows, each is 45 m long and 1 m wide. 
Between rows there are 3 m wide paths, and mines are buried in 
1 x 1 m squares.
An interesting fact was that the reflectance spectra of grass IN 
and OUT of the minefield are different. The reflectance spectra IN 
the minefield show healthy grass in its full developmental phase, 
with a local maximum near 550 nm (chlorophyll), a deep mini-
mum near 690 nm, and a step of reflectance after the red edge. 
The spectra of the grass OUT of the minefield had distorted form, 
very different from the form of grass in the minefield. In the fol-
lowing phase, many different vegetation indices (from ENVI soft-
ware list) were tested regarding their potential to quantify results 
of the mentioned spectral difference. In this analysis, we used the 
hyperspectral data collected by the V9 line scanner from a heli-
copter flying at altitudes of 210 m and 400 m. The provided spa-
tial resolution was 0.4 m, data were parametrically geocoded and 
the radiometric/atmospheric calibrating were applied. Among 
the considered vegetation indices, six were stable in discriminat-
ing grass IN and OUT of the minefield, Table 2. The best results 
were obtained via carotenoid, whereas the chlorophyll total and 
CRI indices were obtained from Gitelson 2002, therefore further 
Survey Function N50
Detection 1.5
Classification 3.0  
Recognition 6.0 
Identification 12.0
Table 1. N50 values for 50% survey.
Table courtesy of M. Bajić.
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Figure 15. Required spatial resolution (m) for the required probabil-
ity of the four survey functions in the case of the mortar mine M60. 
Figure courtesy of M. Bajić.
Figure 16a.
Figure 16b.
Figure 16c.
Figure 16d. Figure 16e. Figure 16f.
Not used
recorded (11-14.06.13)
planed but not recorded
I triage
II triage (green)G
Figure 16 (a-f). Scheme of nadir measurements in the Benkovac 
minefield 2013. a) Scheme of collecting hyperspectral data. b) 
Aerial color image of the minefield. c) Legend of ground based nadir 
survey. d), e), and f) Types of the objects buried in the public part, 
landmines PMA-2, PMA-3, parts of a rifle grenade. 
Figures courtesy of HCR-CTRO.
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analysis was done via carotenoid.42 Note that data used for these 
three indices were collected by near real-time frame sensor UHD-
185 from a helicopter, Figure 17. Data for bushes and trees are 
manually excluded from analysis (white blobs). The red polygon is 
the border of the whole Benkovac minefield.
The spatial distribution of the carotenoid of the grassy vege-
tation decreases if the threshold of the carotenoid is increasing, 
Figure 18 (page 62). These changes are presented in Figure 19 (page 
62). The probability density function (PDF) proves that vegetation 
IN and OUT of the minefield can be discriminated. 
DISCUSSION
The large and costly airborne hyperspectral systems were 
available for more than two decades yet without any impact on 
humanitarian mine action.2 Alternatively, the application of 
hyperspectral technology in many civilian domains is widely used 
and well developed and has good results and significant impacts. 
The availability of hyperspectral sensors, which are suitable for use 
via multi-engine UAVs, enables the development of systems that 
can be implemented in humanitarian mine action. In the scope 
of the 2012 TIRAMISU project, two approaches were defined 
with regard to hyperspectral detection of minefields and SHAs.4 
The first approach was realized by three tasks. The first task was 
aimed at researching and developing the hyperspectral system 
for data collecting via multi-engine UAV and helicopter, which 
are suitable for hyperspectral NTS. The second task was to col-
lect hyperspectral data of UXO inside areas where ammunition 
depots have exploded, including pure spectral samples (endmem-
bers) of the area and the object of interest. The third task was to 
analyze and verify the vegetation indices that show the difference 
between grassy vegetation IN and OUT of the minefield. All three 
tasks were accomplished. The results, the conditions, and the limi-
tations are presented in the current paper and elsewhere.13 The sys-
tem for collecting hyperspectral data via multi-engine UAV and 
helicopter was operationally validated and the hyperspectral NTS 
functionality is included in the operational TIRAMISU Advanced 
Intelligence Decision Support System (T-AIDSS), which is the 
advanced version of AIDSS.4,36
Benkovac Simple ratio 
index
Red edge NDVI Vogelman 1 Carotenoid Chlorophyll total CRI
Areas Fig. 3 min max min max min max min max min max min max
OUT 0 7.21 0 0.47 0 1.98 -1.7 18.9 0 .64 0 11.8
IN 0 13.8 0 0.58 0 2.32 -0.8 26.3 0 1.1 0 15.9
Part of IN for 
blind tests 0 13.8 0 0.58 0 2.32 -0.8 26.3 0 1.1 0 15.9
Table 2. Range of values for Benkovac’s vegetation indices. 
Table courtesy of the authors.
Figure 17. Distribution of the carotenoid of grassy vegetation in ROI Benkovac. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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Although the 2012 TIRAMISU project was planned to combine 
the top-down and bottom-up approaches to the research, we were 
limited to two minefields (10,000 sq m and 504,000 sq m) instead 
on the large area (136 sq km = 136,000,000 sq m). Regardless, a 
simple analysis of the reflectance spectra of the grassy vegetation 
in the considered minefield and its neighboring areas showed an 
increase of greenness and vegetation stress, visible in the deterio-
rated shape of the reflectance response in comparison to the shape 
of healthy vegetation.30,31,32,43 In the analysis of the data collected 
by the V9 line scanner, we excluded ground (soil) contribution 
by using the normalized difference vegetation index, while the 
bushes and trees data were manually excluded for both sensors.
Six of many considered vegetation indices that are verified to be 
suitable for the discrimination of grassy vegetation IN and OUT 
of the minefield have been analyzed, whereas only the results for 
the carotenoid are shown. Future research should apply the fusion 
methods of available indices where improvement is expected.17
CONCLUSION
• The first goal was achieved: we developed a system suitable 
for hyperspectral NTS based on the application of currently 
available hyperspectral sensors for multi-engine UAVs. The 
use of full frame hyperspectral camera mounted via UAV 
was proved an innovation for the framework of mine action. 
Figure 18. Increasing the carotenoid threshold decreases the outside (OUT) area quicker than the area inside (IN). Red font indicates the 
threshold level, which is changed from minimum (-2) to maximum (44) and scaled in the range from 0 to 255 (8 bits). 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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Figure 19. Decrease of the areas with the carotenoid outside (OUT 
and inside (IN, IN_B) the minefield near Benkovac.
 Figure courtesy of the authors.
Figure 20. Probability density function of carotenoid inside of the 
Benkovac minefield (PDF_IN_B, PDF_IN_T) and outside (PDF_OUT), 
the dependence on values of threshold level values. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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• The second goal was achieved: the hyperspectral cubes and 
pure spectral samples (endmembers) data were collected for 
a number of the UXO scattered after the ammunition depot 
explosion, and their use has been demonstrated for the mor-
tar mine M60. The diagrams that link the needed probabil-
ity of the survey (from the detection to the identification) 
were derived for all considered UXO.
• The third goal was achieved: proving that the spectral vege-
tation indices enable discrimination of the grassy vegetation 
IN and OUT of the minefield. This was thoroughly analyzed 
on several vegetation indices, whereas the example of the 
carotenoid was presented for the Benkovac minefield (spa-
tial mines density 0.1 min/sq m).
• The appearance and the advancement of the operational 
characteristics of the hyperspectral sensors that are suit-
able for application from UAV is the challenge for deploy-
ment in humanitarian mine action as well as in counter-IED 
domains.
• A variety of interests and approaches came together, e.g., 
hyperspectral technology, vegetation, explosives. We invite 
cooperation in future joint efforts in this domain. 
See endnotes page 66
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years On
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